Why did Russia let Syria fall? Experts say it was a calculated risk

Just 12 hours before the fall of Damascus, Russia, Iran and Türkiye met on the sidelines of the Doha Forum.

Top of the agenda: the impending collapse of the Syrian regime.

The trio were trying to determine if Bashar al-Assad’s government was salvageable.

The three countries issued a strong statement calling for the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity, and for negotiations between rebel group Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Bashar al-Assad.

But by this point, the diplomats most likely knew it was all over.

In an interview with Al Jazeera, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov became increasingly frustrated as the interviewer pressed him on the unfolding situation.

“If you want me to say we lost in Syria, we are so desperate … if this is what you need, let’s continue,” Mr Lavrov said.

Hours later, Damascus fell.

Putin could have sent more firepower — but he didn’t

There’s no doubt the toppling of the Assad regime significantly weakens Vladimir Putin’s Middle East power.

But it’s also clear that Russia was wary of getting caught up in another decades-long conflict.

It also has other strategic relationships with Türkiye and the Arab Gulf states that it perhaps didn’t want to sacrifice for a dying regime.

In the lead-up to the collapse, Russia did launch air strikes on Syrian rebels in support of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces, but not enough to counter the rebel advances on the capital, Damascus.

Assad’s own men put up no fight and abandoned their posts.

If Putin had really wanted to, he could have sent in more military firepower — but he didn’t.

In fact, ABC News VERIFY confirmed Russia moved key military assets away from their posts in Syria earlier this month.

Loading…

So, why did the Kremlin effectively sit back as Syria fell to rebel forces?

Firstly, at least for Putin, his hands were full with the war in Ukraine and he didn’t really want to divert resources elsewhere.

Iran and Lebanon, both backers of Assad, were also fighting battles of their own, with Israel relentlessly targeting what was the region’s strongest rebel force, Hezbollah, in recent months.

The writing was on the wall for Russia. Throwing more resources at Syria wasn’t going to turn things around for Bashar al-Assad.

“I think the Russians, much like the Iranians, knew that Assad was done for,” says Julien Barnes-Dacy, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“I think this was also a question of them cutting their losses [and] realising that they couldn’t bear the pain of backing Assad.”

So, Vladimir Putin appears to have done the unthinkable: striking a deal with his friend’s enemy.

The speculated deal? Agreeing with the rebel HTS forces to let the Assad regime fall quickly, as long as Russia could maintain its strategically important military bases in Syria.

“I think they did strike a deal,” Mr Barnes-Dacy says.

“They helped tell Assad that he had to leave, and I think that obviously smoothed the way for a cleaner transition than many people were anticipating. And I think the likes of Türkiye and Arab states clearly welcome that,” he said.

The Kremlin has since said it would enter into talks with incoming authorities in Syria about Russia’s future military presence.

“Even if there is an agreement, will it hold? Because, of course, when the rebels and others are coming through to try and take Damascus, they’ll sign whatever is put in front of them if it means that Assad can be swiftly deposed,” Mr Barnes-Dacy says.

“But who knows where we’ll stand in six months, in a year, in two years? And obviously there’s a lot of frustration and bitterness towards the Russians and the Iranians and Syria.

But for Russia, it’s better than nothing. To lose all presence after decades of investment would have been an even harder blow.

Russia’s military bases in Syria

Moscow has two military bases in Syria, which are considered among the Kremlin’s most strategically important military outposts: the Khmeimim Air Base near the port city of Latakia and the Tartus naval base on the Mediterranean coast.

The Tartus naval base is particularly critical, providing Russia with its only direct access to the Mediterranean Sea to conduct naval exercises, dock warships and even host nuclear submarines.

Established by the Soviet Union in the 1970s, it was expanded and modernised by Russia in 2012 as the Kremlin began to increase its support for President Assad’s regime.

Maintaining the base is critical for Moscow, given it has now lost its title as regional powerbroker for conflicts between Israel, Iran and Syria.

Russia and its mercenary groups, such as the Wagner Group, already have footholds across Africa’s Sahel region, which includes countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.

“It’s served as a transit point for their operations. Clearly, it’s played a very helpful instrumental role in Russia projecting its power into the Mediterranean and Africa,” Mr Barnes-Dacy says.

“So if that base [in Syria] is lost, if that naval capability is cut off, that will hurt Moscow’s ability to project power in that way.”

With Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria on the back foot and all but destroyed, the theory now is that Putin will lean into other non-state actors within Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance.

Russia looks to Yemen’s Houthis

Moscow has in recent years established and been building its presence in North Africa and Yemen, in particular its relationship with the Houthi rebels.

“The indicators are there … that this relationship is already underway and has been increasing,” University of Sydney Professor Sarah Phillips told the ABC.

“There’s been some weapons transfers — not huge, from what we can tell, but there have been weapons transfers from Russia going to the Houthis.

The actions of Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have been disruptive to global trade.

From an ideological standpoint, they also show the United States and its allies that Israel’s dominance in the region won’t go unchallenged.

“But the thing to remember here is that the Houthis are not Hamas. The Houthis are not Hezbollah. The Houthis are, first and foremost, a domestic group, and they’ve got domestic aims, and they see their international actions through that prism,” Professor Phillips says.

“They want to govern all of Yemen, and particularly they want to gain access to and control over its most resource-rich areas. That’s [their] primary goal.

“They aren’t going to be — or they’ll be very wary of being seen as — ‘guns for hire’ for Vladimir Putin and Russia. The Houthis have always done what the Houthis want to do.”

There is a strong convergence of interests between Russia and the Houthi rebels, but their relationship is unlikely to replace what Moscow has lost in Syria.

One meeting on the sidelines of the Doha Forum heralded the beginning of the end of Putin’s cosy relationship with Assad.

Now there’s most likely a full agenda for meetings with other players, as he looks to exert his influence in the region and beyond.

Loading…