Türkiye and Russia: An Unequal Partnership

The real impact of this balancing act is best observed in the deepening of Türkiye-Russia economic ties, evidenced by several strategic economic agreements as well as responses to geopolitical shifts. These ties have largely driven their broader bilateral relationship, but they have also further highlighted the asymmetric nature of the countries’ interdependence.

Trade and economic cooperation between Türkiye and Russia gained momentum in the 2000s in parallel with the rise of Türkiye as a trading state and with the rapprochement that began in the 1990s. The financial crisis of 2008–09 shook the West’s hegemony on the world stage, highlighting the value of new partnerships. Since the 2010s, with cooling relations and increasing tensions with the West, bilateral trade and economic ties between Türkiye and Russia have strengthened. There was a brief decline in trade after Russia imposed sanctions following the downing of a Russian jet in Syria in 2015, and after the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye, but trade between the two countries quickly increased back to pre-2015 levels and has been on an upward trajectory since then. Yet, although intensive economic relations are generally considered a positive development for a mutually sustainable and strategic partnership, there are several reasons why the Türkiye-Russia economic relationship has further contributed to their power asymmetry rather than interdependence in the classical sense. Trade relations are heavily skewed in Russia’s favor. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) data, Türkiye exported $10.9 billion to Russia in 2023, while importing $45.6 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of around $35 billion.

It is possible to observe a similar dynamic in investment ties. While Russian investments in Türkiye are concentrated in more strategic and higher value-added sectors—such as energy, metallurgy, banking, and automotive—Turkish investments in Russia are concentrated in construction, alcoholic beverages, and chemicals. While Turkish private enterprises that entered the Russian market early on have made substantial investments and hold to this day a significant market share in Russia, Türkiye’s once notable edge—its deeper, more mature market economy experience—has weakened over time as Russia’s private sector has grown and developed. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reports that Turkish investments in Russia rose from $31 million to $47 million annually between 2017 and 2021, while Russian investments in Türkiye amounted to $30 million in the same period. For the 2017–23 period, the total inflow of Russian FDI in Türkiye increased to $423 million.

Undoubtedly, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the nature of their economic dependence has altered. But the war has not reversed the underlying power asymmetry. The war has increased Russia’s reliance on Türkiye as a partner, and so the costs of exiting the relationship have also increased significantly. In February 2022, Russia’s trade with the West began to decline sharply, leaving it isolated from most developed economies and searching for new trade partners. This reality has led to a steep increase in trade with Türkiye. According to TUIK data, Türkiye’s exports to Russia rose from $5.7 billion in 2021 to $9.3 billion in 2022 and $10.9 billion in 2023, essentially signaling a doubling of Turkish exports within two years. The Russian leadership’s attempts to find alternative suppliers to mitigate the negative impact of Western sanctions have certainly been a factor. But other market-driven economic realities have also contributed, such as Turkish companies’ replacing Western companies that have cut trade with Russia or left Russia.

Energy is a determining factor that shapes relations and cooperation between the two countries. While Türkiye has gained a reliable partner that can provide the energy its growing economy needs, Russia has gained a rapidly growing market and a reliable customer. This situation has fostered a long-term relationship of interdependence in bilateral relations. Within the framework of this partnership, various joint projects have been implemented over the years and their scope has expanded over time.

Türkiye began importing natural gas from Russia through Romania and Bulgaria via the Trans-Balkan pipeline in 1988. The Blue Stream pipeline established a direct link between Russia and Türkiye in 1997 for the supply of natural gas. The TurkStream pipeline—which directly supplies Türkiye and is transported to southeastern and central Europe—serves different purposes for Ankara and Moscow. For Ankara, it meets its long-term growing demand for natural gas and strengthens Türkiye’s position as an energy hub. For Moscow, TurkStream, with its direct connection to Türkiye, allows Russia to bypass Ukraine to reach the European market. Moreover, as a result of becoming an alternative route, Türkiye has gained additional importance in Türkiye-Russia relations.

Until recently, Russian policymakers had long resisted Ankara’s demands to become a trading hub for imported Russian natural gas. Their position changed with the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, given the obvious difficulties faced by Russia in exporting gas to Europe. At the Astana Summit in October 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a natural gas hub in Türkiye, following the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline. He asserted that this hub would allow the two countries to jointly regulate gas prices at the market level, avoiding politicization. Since the summit, Türkiye and Russia have been actively working to initiate the hub project. The two countries reported in November 2023 that Gazprom and Türkiye’s state-owned energy company Botaş were working on a road map and that an agreement on practical implementation would be reached soon.

In Türkiye’s view, this gas hub project will increase the country’s function as a bridge between East and West, strengthening its hand economically and geopolitically. In Russia’s view, the project is an important breakthrough that will enable Moscow to recover the natural gas trade volume it lost due to the invasion of Ukraine and to reach European markets. There are, however, lingering questions over the viability of a Türkiye-centered gas hub given the EU’s commitment to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. 

The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Türkiye, backed by an intergovernmental agreement signed in 2010 and officially inaugurated in 2023, is another critical dimension of Türkiye-Russia energy relations. With a total capacity of 4.8 gigawatts, the plant is slated to meet around 10 percent of the needs of the Turkish electricity grid. The Akkuyu NPP has a special significance for Turkish-Russian relations. First, the nuclear agreement between Türkiye and Russia will have a long-term function of linking Türkiye and Russia in the field of energy, as the project is being implemented using a build-own-operate model: Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM) must bear the cost of both the construction and maintenance of the plant, and in return, Türkiye has to purchase 70 percent of the electricity generated by the plant for fifteen years at a fixed rate of $0.1235 per kilowatt-hour. Türkiye pursued this project as a way to increase Türkiye’s energy independence, but critics have said that the operating model will actually increase Türkiye’s dependence on Russia. Indeed, with the commissioning of the nuclear power plant, Türkiye will be dependent not only on Russian natural gas supplied by Gazprom but also on ROSATOM for almost every stage of nuclear power generation. More recently, ROSATOM announced that the company was in discussions with the Turkish government for the construction of a second NPP in Türkiye, also based on a build-own-operate investment scheme. The nuclear energy partnership therefore has the potential to further cement Russia’s role as a critical player in Türkiye’s energy infrastructure.

The tourism sector is another area that reflects uneven relations between Türkiye and Russia. As one of Türkiye’s most important economic sectors, tourism makes significant contributions by bringing in foreign currency and generating employment opportunities. Türkiye was the fourth-most visited country in the world in 2022, with 50.5 million tourists. In the same year, it ranked sixth in international tourism receipts, raking in $41.2 billion. Russia is of particular importance for Türkiye’s tourism sector and every year ranks as either the top or second country sending tourists to Türkiye (alternating with Germany). According to TUIK data, 6.3 million of the 56 million tourists who visited Türkiye in 2023 came from Russia. In return only around 100 thousand Turkish citizens travelled to Russia for tourism in the same year. The dependence on Russian tourists represents an asymmetry in the countries’ bilateral relations. For example, evidenced by the rapid and sharp decline in the number of tourists visiting Türkiye in the period following the downing of the Russian jet in 2015 in Syria, Moscow has the ability to control and influence people-to-people relations between the two countries, especially in the tourism sector. In 2016, after the jet incident, the number of Russian tourists, which fluctuated between 3.5 and 4.5 million in previous years, fell to around 800,000. In 2017, with the warming and revival of Ankara-Moscow relations, this number increased to 4.7 million in 2017 and 6 million in 2018. But as Turkish scholar Seçkin Köstem argues, not being able to attract large groups of tourists from other countries instead of Russia is one of the factors that underscore the asymmetry between Türkiye and the Kremlin.

The nuanced and multifaceted nature of Turkish-Russian relations is deeply tied to Türkiye’s changing relations with the West and its strategic maneuvers for greater autonomy amid ever-evolving geopolitical tides. Viewed through an analytical lens, it is clear Türkiye’s relationship with Russia reflects a complex balancing act rather than a move away from the West. This balancing act, however, has not markedly reduced the asymmetric interdependence that characterizes Turkish-Russian relations (which traditionally has favored Russia and constrained Turkish decisionmaking).

The dynamics of the Türkiye-Russia relationship have certainly changed since Russia’s war against Ukraine began and have even increased Russia’s dependence on Türkiye, giving Ankara a position and degree of influence that was previously unattainable. But this shift has not significantly altered the countries’ underlying asymmetry or resulted in a new equal partnership; it rather marks a subtle recalibration of interdependencies. Inequalities in the levels of economic, strategic, and geopolitical leverage that Türkiye and Russia have remained. The recent nuanced changes observed, while increasing Türkiye’s strategic options and autonomy, have not fundamentally transformed the broader dynamics of their relationship.

As a result, the complexity of Turkish-Russian economic relations—shaped by historical legacies, strategic concerns, and changing global dynamics—will continue to play an important role in the region’s geopolitical landscape.

The subtle recalibration of interdependencies in the midst of the Russia-Ukraine war offers new insights into the potential aspects of the two countries’ relationship. The fundamental question for Turkish policymakers is whether Ankara can sustain this difficult balancing act with Russia. The answer will depend a great deal on the terms of a Russia-Ukraine settlement. Already, under Putin, Russia has become a real and imminent threat for many NATO nations. The nature of the long-term response to this threat by the transatlantic partnership will essentially determine the scope of Ankara’s autonomy and its ability to consolidate its relations with Russia. Should a relatively more unified Western effort to contain and isolate Russia over the long term materialize after the U.S. presidential elections in November 2024—with more sanctions and more investments in defense and deterrence—Ankara will find itself under increased pressure to unravel its deepening ties with Moscow. Such a scenario will present a strategic dilemma for Turkish policymakers given the asymmetry in the Türkiye-Russia relationship and the many negative consequences that a real break with Moscow could entail.

In this series on Russia in the Middle East and North Africa, Carnegie scholars and external experts analyze how Russia has used various foreign policy tools to mount a recent comeback in the region after years of absence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Contributors to the series also examine the impacts of Russian policies on questions of peace, security, and democratic development in the Middle East and North Africa.