Just four days after President Bashar al-Assad fled Syria on the night of December 8, the country’s new strongman, Islamist leader Ahmed al-Sharaa — also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani — was driving through central Damascus with Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), in the passenger seat. Six days later, the Turkish flag was raised again at the embassy in the Syrian capital, which had been closed for 12 years. And just two weeks after the regime’s collapse, Ankara’s top diplomat, Hakan Fidan, became the first foreign minister to visit al-Sharaa, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who was seen wearing a suit and tie for the first time. It was all part of a carefully crafted image of a moderate ruler for the head of the militia who, just a month ago, in a lightning 12-day offensive, forced Assad to flee to Moscow after a quarter of a century in power.
In the culmination of its neo-Ottoman expansion strategy across part of its former empire, Turkey has quickly staked its claim in Syria. An unprecedented deployment of spies, diplomats, security agents, and bodyguards has been visible on the streets and in hotels of Damascus. Ankara has also sent 120 members of its Ministry of the Interior’s rescue teams to search for hidden underground cells in the notorious Saidnaya prison, a symbol of the atrocities committed by the Assad family during half a century of dictatorship. Dozens of Turkish reporters have closely followed these developments, with Turkish media deploying one of the largest international presences in the country, including television broadcasting teams stationed at key points in the Syrian capital.
Since becoming Turkey’s top political leader in 2002, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had to wait for his gamble on the Syrian opposition and his stance against the Assad regime to pay off, emerging as a winner after more than 13 years of civil strife, destruction, and barbarism. Turkey has worked hard to reverse its course as sidelined power — a position the war had relegated it to.
The downing of a Russian Su-24 fighter jet by the Turkish air force in November 2015 on the Syrian border, described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as a “treacherous attack,” led to heightened tensions with Moscow, which retaliated with harsh economic sanctions on Ankara. Erdogan was forced to apologize seven months later and accept Russia’s dominance — and the dominance of its allies in Iran and the Shiite militias — on Syria’s battlefields. He also agreed to submit to the Astana negotiation process, overseen by Russia with Iranian support in Kazakhstan’s capital, effectively sidelining the U.N.-sponsored peace talks in Geneva.
A leader as direct as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has been quick to point out that “Turkey now holds the key to what happens in Syria.” The Republican leader, who established a close relationship with Turkish President Erdogan during his first term, now seems intent on strengthening it further. “Erdogan is somebody I got along with great,” said Trump, adding the Turkish leader has “built a very strong, powerful army.”
“No other crisis has redefined Turkey’s place in regional and international politics as much as the Syrian conflict,” states a recent report from the Royal Institute of International Studies in London, better known as Chatham House. The analysis from this British think tank highlights that Erdogan’s strong support for the Syrian opposition has boosted expectations of his increased influence in Damascus.“The fall of Assad will probably have a reverse effect: it will likely put more pressure on Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran while driving Turkey and the West closer,” adds the report.
During a visit from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who brought an additional €1 billion to ease the burden of Syrian refugees, Erdogan called for a “tangible and immediate” improvement in relations between Turkey and the European Union. After 25 years of stalled EU membership talks, Ankara is now demanding a new Customs Union agreement to replace the one from 2005 and the elimination of visa requirements for its nationals within the Schengen area.
Turkey’s influence in Syria seems to have reached its peak with the collapse of the Assad regime. From the outset of his successive terms — as both prime minister and president with full executive powers — Erdogan championed a neo-Ottoman diplomatic approach in Syria, based on economic interdependence with countries that once formed part of the Ottoman Empire. With a 560-mile border along the historic Silk Road, trade ties, tourism, and cooperation between the two countries thrived until 2011, when Erdogan sided with opposition forces and severed ties with Damascus following the outbreak of the Arab Spring.
Turkey has specifically supported Islamist militias linked to the political orbit of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that originated in Egypt over a century ago. These groups later formed the Syrian National Army (SNA), formerly known as the Free Syrian Army. These factions became a key force used by Ankara against Kurdish fighters, who were allied with the United States in the fight against ISIS. The militias also established a presence in the southern part of Syria, along the border with Jordan and the Golan Heights, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Israel has used the regime’s collapse as an opportunity to expand its territorial control in the region.
Although Turkey initially considered Hayat Tahrir al-Sham a terrorist group due to its Al-Qaeda origins, it has maintained control over border supplies and humanitarian aid entering Idlib, the last significant stronghold of the Islamist opposition in northwestern Syria.
Turkish relations with HTS have grown increasingly close. Following the final offensive against Assad — in which Ankara denies direct involvement, though it is hard to imagine it occurring without at least tacit approval — Turkey’s presence and influence in Syria have expanded. And Turkey expected to play a significant role in the future.
Amidst the civil conflict, Turkey deployed peacekeeping forces to the Idlib enclave, which had been under siege by the Syrian government and its allies for years. Turkish presence is visible in the newly established Syrian security forces, which emerged from HTS and now patrol areas around Damascus and Homs. Alongside senior officials managing day-to-day local administration, it is common to see political advisers who have returned to their hometowns from Idlib, dressed in the elegant, Italian-inspired fashion of Istanbul.
However, to reap the rewards of Syria’s reconstruction for its major companies, Turkey will need to invest significant resources while awaiting international aid. The Istanbul Stock Exchange saw gains of up to 10% in the first session after Assad’s regime fell, reflecting optimism for rebuilding. The Ministry of Transport has already drafted plans to repair roads, bridges, and airports. With only Damascus and Aleppo airports operational (albeit precariously), Turkey’s push for Syrian stability is crucial, especially as it hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees.
An alternative answer to the Kurdish question
In the past three weeks, Turkey and its Syrian allies have forced the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kurdish-based militias linked to the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — which has been fighting against Ankara’s central government in southeastern Anatolia for over four decades — to retreat east of the Euphrates River. The new situation in Syria, now without Assad, has left the country’s Kurds appearing weaker, but it also presents a potential opening for a political solution to Turkey’s longstanding Kurdish question.
A proposal from ultra-nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli, Erdogan’s parliamentary ally, to release PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan — who has been serving a life sentence since his capture in 1999 — is already on the table as a potential first step, provided he orders the cessation of the armed struggle and the dissolution of the guerrilla group.
For the first time since the failed 2013 peace process between the Turkish government and the PKK, Kurdish nationalist MPs from Turkey have been allowed to visit Öcalan, who is now 76, at the Imrali prison in the Sea of Marmara. In a note published last Sunday on the website of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Party (DEM), Öcalan stated: “I am ready… to make the call [for the dissolution of the PKK]. Incidents in Gaza and Syria demonstrated that the solution to this problem that is being aggravated by external intervention cannot be delayed any longer.” The internal Kurdish conflict in Turkey has claimed around 45,000 lives since it began in 1984.
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