Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region

This chapter is part of a report on the prospects for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Western countries in the Black Sea region in the new geopolitical setting following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Assessing the strategic environment

In its Black Sea neighborhood, which includes Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, Turkey faces a centuries old dilemma. On one hand, Turkish leaders see a strategic imperative to oppose the hegemony of Russia, the only regional actor with an imperial appetite. On the other hand, trade ties and mutual strategic vulnerability compel Ankara to seek the least risky modus vivendi with Moscow—and to avoid interventions by extraregional powers that could escalate into direct warfare between Russian and Turkish forces.

Time tests ideas and approaches. During the Cold War, a deep disparity between Soviet and Turkish power compelled Turkey to balance Russia through NATO membership, which included the stationing of American troops, aircraft, and tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. After 1991, the gap between Russian and Turkish deterrent capabilities decreased, while messy Western military interventions on Turkey’s southern borders left Ankara disinclined to trust those Western powers in the Black Sea region. Consequently, Turkish strategy in the region shifted from NATO-assisted deterrence of Russia to a triangular balance in which Turkey seeks to offset Russian power by strengthening both its own capabilities and those of non-NATO allies (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), defense cooperation with littoral NATO states without broader NATO presence, and maintaining robust economic and diplomatic ties with Russia while developing military deterrent measures against it.

The goal of triangular balancing has been a constrained competition, or condominium that compartmentalizes conflict, preserves trade and diplomatic contacts, and prioritizes military de-escalation. A key part of this approach has been supporting Ukrainian sovereignty without seeking total Russian defeat. Prior to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ankara sought to co-opt Russia in local security initiatives that minimized the role for extraregional states. After 2014, Ankara focused on a military force-building project with Ukraine, which accelerated after Russia’s expanded invasion in 2022 and led to defense industrial symbiosis in several areas.

Turkey wants both Ukraine and Russia, as neighbors, to survive—and that means Ankara wants Moscow to have incentives to settle for less than outright victory. For the foreseeable future, this objective will require an activist stance in military and diplomatic affairs in the region—and neither acquiescing to NATO’s lead nor Russian revanchism in the process. As the United States crafts a new Black Sea strategy, and NATO plans for enduring commitments to Ukraine, both would do well to understand this Turkish approach, and work effectively alongside it.

Doing so entails three critical elements: NATO must strengthen Turkey’s own deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis Russia, recognize and facilitate Turkish leadership in NATO operations in the region, and consult Ankara regarding conflict termination modalities, especially arrangements for peacekeeping forces and the approach to Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO candidacy. In other words, the West would be wise to support a stable strategic triangle in the region consisting of Russia, Turkish-aligned non-NATO members (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and NATO via its Black Sea littoral members. It should avoid a strict binary equation in the region, recognizing that the combination of Turkey’s participation in NATO, its defense ties to non-NATO countries, and its continued engagement with Russia provide unique tools to influence Russian behavior in both the present war and the regional future.

Successful deterrence in this manner may enable the region to emerge from the war as what President Erdoğan has called a “basin of peace” in which Russia has a legitimate but constrained role. Ankara would welcome a settlement that leads to energy deals and trade that Russia cannot, or will not, disrupt. Turkish foreign policy statements have made clear that Ankara sees this combination of deterrence, de-escalation, and economic mutual interest as the key to the future security of the region—and a Turkish role will be crucial. Given Russia’s apparent ability to sustain the war and the West’s limited appetite for escalation, it is the security strategy that offers the greatest chance of success in the coming years.

Turkey’s regional role and interests

Turkey has long pursued a Black Sea security architecture that supports Ukrainian independence, balances Russian power without directly confronting it, and strengthens other littoral states (NATO and non-NATO). Ankara developed a politico-economic forum, BSEC; multilateral security mechanisms including Russia, Black Sea Force, and Black Sea Harmony; and a multinational brigade comprised of units from NATO countries operating independently of NATO command, the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG).

Then Ankara witnessed Moscow’s willingness to launch hot wars against smaller neighbors (such as Georgia in 2008), and that it was not likely to be restrained by an inclusive approach and trust-building measures. This realization encouraged Turkish leadership to enhance their own hard-power deterrent capabilities, a process that played out over a decade as Turkey developed significant power projection capabilities—from Libya and Syria to the Caucasus and beyond—and demonstrated a willingness to use them against Russian forces or proxies in regional conflicts.

Vladimir Socor, a Romanian-American geopolitical analyst, discussed the evolution of Turkey’s approach to the region in the face of Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions:

There have been and remain limits to how far the West can go on “improving Turkish attitudes” on the Black Sea. Over a twenty-year period, the Turks staunchly opposed NATO activity there, for example by stopping the attempt to expand Operation Active Endeavor from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Turkish policy then was a condominium with Russia, while minimizing Western presence. This entailed allowing only what the Montreux Convention, strictly construed, would allow. Instead of a steady Western presence, Turkey tried to establish a Black Sea Force naval patrol mechanism that included Russia—the hope for a neighbors’ condominium. Before Crimea, Turkey could believe it had naval parity. After Crimea, the sense of naval parity was gone; the ability for land-based forces to strike at sea had to be added to the naval equation. Russia now appeared superior in the overall balance of power in the [Black Sea region], especially in terms of anti-access and area denial (A2AD) weapons. Turkey appears at times to be intimidated by Russia in the Black Sea, hunkering down near its own coast. It can be argued that Turkey tried to avoid conflict by appeasing Russia even after Georgia [in] 2008, when the Russian Navy attacked and destroyed the Georgian coastal guard in port [at Poti]. Turkey continued the Black Sea Force—though Romania wanted to end it. Finally, the 2014 invasion of Crimea metaphorically sank the Black Sea Force as a concept.

Turkey’s public response to the 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimea and Ukraine’s eastern provinces was relatively muted, but Ankara has consistently supported Ukrainian sovereignty over these territories, supported UN condemnations of the invasion, and called for Ukrainian accession to NATO. More importantly, Ankara paired cautious diplomatic opposition with stout efforts to bolster Ukrainian defense capabilities far earlier than the West. Initial discussions on defense industrial cooperation took place in 2015, with senior officials from the two countries agreeing to elevate such ties to a strategic level in early 2016, covering a broad array of programs and technologies. This came at a time of escalating Russo-Turkish tensions, and reticence by Washington and European allies to arm Ukraine. Within five years this deepening defense relationship yielded more than thirty joint defense projects, including drones, motors, electronics, ground systems and naval vessels. Many of these projects involve complementary production and development rather than simple sales or transfers.

Less publicly, Turkey in 2016 appears to have sent a multiservice assessment team to lay the groundwork for training programs involving staff officers, special forces, and naval personnel. Turkish support continued in the years prior to Putin’s February 2022 escalated invasion, despite the risk of Russian retaliation. Turkish-made TB2 Bayraktar armed drones made their debut in Ukraine in October 2021, fighting against Russian proxies in Donetsk. Turkish support for the equipping and training of Ukrainian defense forces predates the current phase of the war and seems certain to continue after its conclusion. The contributions to Ukraine’s defense from the United States and Germany have surpassed Turkish aid over the past two years, but the timing of Turkish assistance was especially impactful before the larger donors fully beginning in 2022.

Turkish impact on the war in Ukraine

Despite Russian protestations, Turkish military and defense industrial support continued up to and beyond February 24, 2022. The TB2s drew attention through widely distributed videos of their strikes on advancing Russian columns, and were memorialized in song by Ukrainians grateful for their role in blunting the Russian drive on Kyiv. Other weapon systems proved useful, too. Kirpi armored vehicles have provided protection for light units and logistics convoys, while Turkish machine guns have enhanced ground unit defensive capabilities. Turkish shipyards have produced Ada-class corvettes to strengthen Ukrainian naval defense, though their extended delivery schedule and limited basing options limit near-term impact.

Artillery ammunition has emerged as a mainstay of Turkish defense industrial support to Ukraine. Turkey’s Mechanical and Chemical Industrial Corporation produces a significant portion of NATO’s 155 millimeter ammunition supply, and has exported directly to Ukraine since the war began. These may have included rounds with dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, or DPICM (“cluster bombs”), a potent tool against Russian ground forces, though Turkey denies doing so. The Turkish firm Repkon has begun production of 155 mm ammunition at a factory in Texas, which should increase American production by a third, and will be used to further augment Ukrainian supply should the war extend for years. Turkey has become the leading exporter of artillery ammunition to the United States, has made massive ammunition deliveries directly to Ukraine, and is key to NATO’s efforts to match Russian output as the war in Ukraine has become, among other things, a large-scale, continuous artillery duel.

What do experts think about how determinative this has been to the course of the war?

Can Kasapoglu, a Turkish defense analyst at the Hudson Institute, noted that Turkey stepped in when no others would, and when battlefield conditions maximized the impact of the aid:

Turkish assistance was like a cortisone shot, effective and crucial to keep the body moving despite pain. It was critical at the outset that Turkey was contributing TB2s when other NATO members were arguing about nonlethal aid like helmets. They were very useful at a time when the battlefield was very messy, and the Russians were struggling to put together multiple-corps level operations—unlike anything they had seen in 2014, in Georgia, or in the Chechen wars. There were gaps in Russian integrated air defense, clumsy logistics, incomplete battlefield intelligence and surveillance. The Ukrainians pursued a different target set than the Russians anticipated—they were more interested in hunting down bread trucks and fuel tankers than artillery or main battle tanks, because they knew logistics would be the Achilles’ heel of a drive on Kyiv. Turkish aid also gave a huge political boost—remember that at that time the West was offering Zelensky a flight out of Kyiv, while he was committed to staying and resisting. It was a critical turning point in the political and popular will to resist—and helped rally the resistance and defense while singing the praises of TB2 Bayraktar. It may be less critical now, but was hugely critical then.

Vlad Socor, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, expressed skepticism that the support has been sufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory, though it may have staved off immediate defeat:

There may not be an end to the war in the commonly understood sense. References to “when peace comes,” or “after the end of the war,” lose meaning in the age of hybrid war, with no clear delineation of war and peace. At best there will be an armistice, codified or not. It will become frozen with varying degrees of conflict continuing, with spikes of high intensity, and long-term low intensity conflict. This is likely to resemble the state of affairs from 2015 to 2022 in Ukraine. It can further be argued that Russia has already won, in the sense that Hans Petter Midttun asserted in 2023—Russia does not need to win another square centimeter of [Ukrainian] territory in order to win the war. It cannot be dislodged; it could have been dislodged in summer 2023 if the Biden admin had not self-deterred. Ukraine has suffered a catastrophic hemorrhage of civilian population to the West and to Russia. Depopulation, destruction, lost access to most of Black Sea have ensued. The West is prepared to provide some military protection to rump Ukraine, and in that sense Turkish aid will become even less relevant over time.

The future course of the war in Ukraine is unclear as of mid-2024, but the role of Turkish arms, training, and defense industrial cooperation heretofore has been significant. Turkey helps Ukraine for several reasons: two-way technology transfer, profit, supporting NATO—but above all else, the knowledge that Ukrainian defeat would transform Russia into a far more dangerous neighbor.

Possible areas of cooperation with the West

In the coming years, and no matter the course of that war, Ankara possesses unique assets to stabilize the region through its:

1. Defense industry.
2. Naval power.
3. Geography/control of the straits.
4. Ability to expand cooperation within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).
5. Diplomatic agility.

In the national defense sector, for instance, Turkey has begun production of a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the Kaan, with a prototype flown on February 21, 2024. Ukraine has indicated that it will buy, and perhaps help build, the Kaan.Overall, Turkish defense industry output nearly doubled between the 2008 Georgia war and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, making Turkey the world’s eleventh-largest arms exporter (with 1.1% of global output), and dramatically reducing reliance on arms imports. The defense industrial partnership between Turkey and  Ukraine is a good fit, and goes both ways: Ukraine produces systems that Turkey has lagged in, such as high-thrust engines for aircraft.Ukrainian forces have destroyed between 20 percent and 30 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet, in some cases using Turkish systems, shifting the long-term naval balance of power in the region. Turkish advances in unmanned systems have provided a partial equalizer to Russian defense technological advantages, one that helps Ukrainian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and other Russian neighbors to deter or blunt Russian military adventures, or at least the ability to support them from the sea. A major naval buildup in recent years, led by indigenously produced ships and systems, has put the Turkish Navy on a more equal footing with Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

Control of the straits favors Turkey in the Black Sea in a way that no other power can replicate. Montreux rights have been used well since the start of the war. Kasapoglu put it this way:

After Ukraine destroyed a good portion of the Black Sea fleet without a real fleet of their own to speak of—unprecedented in modern warfare—the Russians were vulnerable because they could not augment from other fleets. The damage was done not with frigates or submarines, but with ground-based missiles and unmanned systems. Russian concepts of A2/AD were used against them by Ukraine’s coastal defense program; the beast is not immune to its own venom, and Montreux helped.

Turkey has yet to fully gain the upper hand over Russia in the Black Sea region. There is no freedom of navigation, though the Russians have been pushed off the coast of Ukraine. A narrow strip along the territorial seas of Romania and Bulgaria remains open, but the costs of insurance, and demining prohibit normal commerce. The Ukrainian ports of Kherson and Mykolaiv remain blocked—stranding several Turkish merchant ships in Kherson since February 2022. Turkey has not troubled Russia over the Shukru Okan incident, in which Russian forces forcibly boarded and inspected a small Turkish ship. 

Deepening cooperation within the OTS provides Ankara additional diplomatic and economic partners with a common view of the region as a secure, stable, and prosperous stretch of the Middle Corridor, an east-west economic project free from Russian (or Iranian) control. Economic partnerships can complement Turkish hard-power deterrence in the region through development projects that benefit Russia as well as other littoral and regional states. The Turkish-brokered grain deal of 2023 provides an example of such thinking: by negotiating terms for the sale of Ukrainian and Russian grain, Ankara was, for a time, able to help both countries, as well as grain consumers further afield. The deal had numerous shortcomings, but demonstrated Turkey’s diplomatic agility—the ability to convene both conflict parties and generate creative, economically-oriented approaches to de-escalation.

Obstacles and challenges: Russia, littoral sensitivity, and intra-NATO trust deficit

Despite Turkey’s great potential for strengthening the defense of Ukraine, bolstering NATO deterrence, and stabilizing the region, three key dynamics limit the room for convergence with Ankara’s Western partners:

1. Risk aversion in Ankara regarding Moscow.
2. Skepticism and sensitivity regarding greater NATO presence in the Black Sea region, and actions by some Western powers to limit Turkish aid to Ukraine, even though Turkey is one NATO member that Putin knows can and will hit back effectively—a legacy of conflicts in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus. 
3. Possession of the means and will to inflict pain on Russia, which may create a mutual interdependence with costs that deter conflict.

This brutal agreement or mutual deterrence epitomizes Ankara’s Eurasian strategy of balancing against Russia with NATO, Black Sea neighbors Ukraine and Georgia, and the OTS, while assuring Russia that such balancing is not a prelude to open antagonism. This enigmatic relationship inclines Turkish strategy more toward deterrence and diplomatic overtures than mutual economic injury with the Russians.

This strategy comports with US interests in limiting Russian aggression, despite the difference in method. Erdoğan has made it clear that Turkey can and will push back against Russia over a broad geographical range, but prefers to do so cautiously and patiently in the region. The rough symmetry that underwrites this arrangement would be upset were Ukraine to lose access to the sea. 

The Russians understand that Turkish regional hedging not only limits their reach, but also militates against perceived Western threats and intrusions in or near the Black Sea. This exemplifies the Turkish tradition of balancing Russia against the West to ensure autonomy from both, as noted in the opening of the chapter. Complex interdependence with Russia conveys mutual leverage, meaning that both sides have reason to reach mutually acceptable stability in the Black Sea region; it may be the only significant nonzero-sum factor in the current regional security equation, and therefore a unique advantage for postconflict arrangements.

Western security analysts have argued that securing NATO’s southern flank and the Black Sea region more generally requires a more robust military presence in Romania, Bulgaria, and on the Black Sea. The latter proposition runs headlong into Turkey’s “blue homeland” doctrine, which dictates that Turkey assert primacy in its near waters with the same vigor it affords ground territory and airspace. In the case of the Black Sea, this can be read as: NATO does not own the Black Sea, nor will Russia. Western pressure for greater access for nonlittoral navies is viewed by Ankara as escalatory and unnecessary. Turkey’s experience with Western interventions on its southern borders (e.g., Iraq, Syria) has not been positive, and they are anxious not to turn the Black Sea region into the Middle East. 

If Ankara will brook no external lead for Black Sea security, is it willing and able to take on the role? There are positive signs. One came earlier this year when a Turkish F-16 flying from a Romanian airbase went to investigate possible debris on Romanian territory after a Russian drone attack near Ukraine’s border with Romania. Bulgaria has signed a new agreement with Turkey to allow similar flights. Another example is Turkish contribution to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a brigade-sized force created in 2014 to bolster NATO’s deterrence against conventional attack. 

While Turkey’s role in maritime security is often discussed, its role in the air domain is less examined. The US approval of F-16 modernization kits will make Turkey a stronger anchor on NATO’s southern aerial flank. As US allies in and near the region, and Ukraine, expand the use of their F-16s, Turkey’s decades of experience with the platform (including maintenance and production capabilities) will necessarily strengthen NATO’s southern capabilities in the air. Expanded air presence from NATO, expanded Ukrainian capability, and better intra-NATO air coordination will enable NATO to more effectively contest Russian air superiority, adding another layer of deterrence.

Kasapoglu believes NATO has smart options to strengthen its position in the region without major naval assets passing through the straits: 

A logical alternative to pressing Montreux’s limits is to provide everything and anything that relates to the three littoral states that are in NATO—resources, infrastructure, and authorities. A scenario in which Ankara was flexible enough on Montreux to allow US carriers or subs in? Even the most Atlanticist government in Turkey wouldn’t do it. Then policy pillars for Turkey in the Black Sea were two: Montreux and regional ownership. The latter is in tatters now due to Russian actions. There is an opportunity for the West to make the case that Russia destroyed the second pillar—and that NATO must grow new capabilities in the south to ensure Russia doesn’t end with the commanding position. 

One part of the challenge, then, consists of NATO recognizing and working within Turkish sensitivities regarding the role of nonlittoral NATO states operating in the Black Sea region, and recognizing Turkey as the lead NATO power within it. Yet NATO working under Turkish lead there would require the rebuilding of mutual trust, which has been undermined by actions beyond the region over the past two decades. As Socor notes: 

Working together in the Black Sea must begin outside of the Black Sea. The U.S. must meet Turkish concerns about the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party]—stop paying and arming the YPG [People’s Protection Units affiliated with the Syrian Kurdish population] in Syria. There is a great deal of mistrust toward the U.S.—not just Erdoğan, but at a popular level. We must rebuild trust beginning with northern Syria. Turkey has interests beyond the Black Sea that require tranquility in the Black Sea: Libya, Somalia, elsewhere. This has led to a modus vivendi with Russia on terms favorable to Russia. To change that calculus, Syria is the starting point. The second step is the U.S. demonstrating that it can and will stand up to Russia, and shield Turkey, if necessary, from Russian retaliation. Ankara considers the Biden administration position on Russia—pusillanimity—when deciding how much risk to accept. 

Lt. Gen. (retired) Ben Hodges, former commander of NATO Land Command in Izmir, Turkey, also sees a need to rebuild trust as part of an enhanced NATO presence in the Black Sea region: 

The U.S. and other European nations should work hard to regain Turkey’s trust, sort of a U.S.-Turkey 2.0. A clearly defined US strategy for the greater Black Sea region developed in coordination with Ankara and accounting for Turkish interests and concerns would go a long way to helping rebuild that trust. At the same time, the U.S. should look for ways to maximize its opportunities for naval presence within the parameters of the Montreux Convention. In past years, we used less than 50 percent of the available days in the Black Sea because of a lack of US Navy resources and because it was not a high enough priority.

Italian security analyst Maurizio Geri notes that rebuilding trust between Ankara and its Western allies regarding the Black Sea has significant strategic implications. They are crucial, he says, “not only for the U.S. and NATO but for Europe more broadly, in particular because Turkey connects Europe with Central Asia, through Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan—and in the future perhaps through European Russia.” NATO allies and the US government need to see and address “this long-term value in economic and geopolitical terms,” he adds. 

Yet the new US Black Sea strategy risks further eroding trust and repeating the mistakes of Syria and Iraq—by not making early strategic compromises with Turkey that will lead to support, rather than resistance, to Washington’s approach. The new, congressionally mandated, US strategy for the Black Sea appears not to have considered Turkish concerns in a substantive way. As the Atlantic Council’s Arnold Dupuy says: 

Turkey was very much absent from the initial strategy that came out last year, and a slightly updated version in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act—it was just listed as a regional state. There has to be a diplomatic effort with Turkey to work with them and not around them—Turkey has to play a key role, and there has to be a reassurance campaign. Yet formal strategy documents do not yet reflect such cooperation as an imperative. 

In other words, he says, Washington cannot ignore the Black Sea country with the longest coastline, significant economic strength, and naval forces.

More Turkish hedging behavior is likely, according to Kasapoglu, if this NATO member is presented with a strategy without consultation with Ankara in its developmental stage. Without that, it is a “deal-breaker.” He points to what happened in Syria:

In Syria it hasn’t gotten everything it wanted, but assigned talismanic value to confounding deals made without its inclusion. We are talking about the biggest NATO player in the region, and with much overlap with the U.S. regarding a strong Ukraine. Building coastal defenses, strengthening Georgia, strengthening [the Ukrainian] defense industry: we overlap on all. Leaving the Turks out in the cold is replicating the Syrian mistake.

US strategy documents are not the only irritant inhibiting trust. Another is the effort of certain EU members (especially France, Greece, and Cyprus) to prevent EU funding for purchases of military aid for Ukraine from non-EU members. The latter had the effect of slowing the provision of Turkish-made artillery shells to Kyiv, while the United States was finalizing a bilateral deal bringing Turkish artillery production lines to Texas to help meet both American and Ukrainian needs. When a coalition of European powers try to undercut Turkish power elsewhere, it is hard to see how Europe can leverage Turkish power to help stabilize the Black Sea region.

Scenarios and recommendations (Part 3)

Experts disagree on where the war in Ukraine is headed, but generally agree that in either best- or worst-case scenarios, Western interests in the Black Sea region will require closer consultation and collaboration with Turkey. In the best case, continued Western assistance would stabilize Ukrainian defenses, enabling Ukrainians to retake territory lost to the Russians in recent years, and catalyzing negotiations that would probably almost certainly involve a Turkish role as facilitator, observer, and guarantor. In the worst case, a Russian victory would imperil a rump Ukraine and other littoral states in a manner that would certainly require Turkish hard power to deter. 

Recent positive movements in US-Turkish bilateral relations, including the F-16 deal and Sweden’s NATO accession, augur a strategic reconvergence that could facilitate a more secure and NATO-friendly region. Increased US diplomatic traffic to Turkey—particularly by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland (who retired in March)—created clearer channels for collaboration on Ukraine, Gaza, and other crisis areas. The simultaneous presence of an effective, well-connected US ambassador in Ankara and successive effective, well-connected Turkish ambassadors in Washington, have created opportunities for new growth in business and defense relationships. 

The United States and its European allies should seek to build on this positive trend with concrete steps specific to achieving a stable triangular security equation in the Black Sea region:

1. Support defense industrial complementarity between the NATO members and Turkey, as well as Ukraine and Turkey. Renewed F-16 sales and Turkish production of artillery shells in Texas are a small start to defense industrial production deals that will strengthen all three countries. As US defense assistance flows to Ukraine, some should go to Turkish-Ukrainian projects that will be sustainable once US funding flows decrease. Defense cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan—as well as economic support to the development of the Middle Corridor—should be pursued to strengthen the “Turkey and others” leg of the triangular equation. European allies should pursue more joint defense production with Turkish partners, and suspend or remove spending policies that limit common EU funding from non-EU producers of critical defense goods. 
2. Strengthen the capabilities of littoral NATO states in the region (i.e., Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) for air defense, naval defense/anti-ship missiles, and ground defensive capabilities to raise the costs of further Russian adventurism to unsustainable levels. 
3. Recognize the central role of Turkey in the region by consulting with its officials on US and NATO strategy during formulation, not after promulgation. Such consultations, as well as recognizing Turkey’s lead in NATO operations in the Black Sea region, will help avoid triggering Ankara’s hedging instincts. Washington and Brussels must avoid the temptation to work around or over Ankara when planning and resourcing security for the region; they must work with and through, instead.

Turkey, working together with its network of littoral NATO allies and non-NATO regional partners, is in a position to strengthen multilateral deterrence of further Russian aggression in the region even while it engages Moscow economically and maintains positive diplomatic relations that can reduce Russian paranoia and create openings for de-escalation. Multilateral deterrence depends in turn upon Turkish conventional military power, both its large array of forces and its proven ability to train, equip, and coordinate with forces beyond its own borders. Washington can supplement this deterrent package through the steps listed above. Other actions taken outside the Black Sea region will also affect the quality of Turkish cooperation with Western partners in it, most critically cessation or continuation of support to the YPG in Syria. Whatever the course of the war in Ukraine, stability in the Black Sea region on terms favorable to the Alliance can only be envisaged in the context of convergence with its most potent regional ally.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas.”

Colonel (retired) Rich Outzen, PhD, is a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC. He served in the Department of State as both a military and civilian advisor from 2016 through 2021, working in the Policy Planning office and later the office of the Special Representative for Syria (SRS). He was a member of the National Defense University (NDU) and Institute for National Security Studies faculty from July 2013 through June 2016. He served as the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2014-2015, on temporary duty from NDU. He previously served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Development for the U.S. Security Coordinator in Jerusalem. He has researched and published extensively on matters of policy and strategy, with a focus on the greater Middle East and Central Asia. A U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer, he has served in a variety of staff, command, and policy support assignments in Washington, D.C. and overseas. He has helped shape interagency discussion and national policy options for transitions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.  His areas of expertise include Defense Policy and Strategy, Strategic Culture, the Middle East, NATO/Europe, and Central Asia.

Image: US and Turkish military forces conduct a joint ground patrol inside the security mechanism area in northeast, Syria, October 4, 2019. Picture taken October 4, 2019. U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Andrew Goedl/Handout via REUTERS.