The Turkish defense technological and industrial base has reached a critical mass across certain segments. The successful trajectory of the unfolding projects manifests a new reality in the realm of air power. While the Bayraktar TB-2, aka the “flying Kalashnikov” by Baykar, has made most of the headlines, the Turkish drone program is not merely about that. Turkey has built a reputable edge in designing wide range of high-value assets.
In the drone warfare segment, Baykar’s unmanned combat aircraft Kizilelma and the company’s high-altitude drone equipped with high-end weapons, Akinci, as well as Turkish Aerospace Industries’ flying wing, stealthy unmanned combat aircraft Anka-3 loom large as some examples. Even more importantly, the Anka-3 and Kizilelma are designed to fly within the loyal wingman concept alongside manned aircraft, which is technically a sixth-generation tactical military aviation feature, presaging the future horizons of Turkish defense planning.
In the manned fighter jet segment, Kaan, formerly known as the Milli Muharip Uçak, presents interesting takeaways to grasp the Turkish defense industry’s international dynamics. In February 2024, Turkey’s indigenous, stealth combat aircraft, Kaan, conducted its maiden flight. Besides painting a shiny picture of the future of Turkish air power, Kaan also sheds light on some of the ongoing capability limitations of the nation’s defense technological and industrial base (DTIB). The first problem pertains to the jet’s power configuration. The initial batches, and the prototype of the aircraft, fly with the F-110 engines that power the F-16 fighter jet, illustrating a clear dependency.
With the rising trajectory and still-in-place limitations of the Turkish DTIB’s air power generation capacity, one has to answer two political-military questions pertaining to the nature of defense business: First, what kind of an arms exporter is Turkey to become considering its aerial assets? Will it follow a more reserved model, such as Germany? Or a more business-friendly one like France? Or, will it pursue more of a market disrupter role like China? Second, how will the nation’s foreign collaboration network take shape?
Turkey’s defense cooperation outlook
From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey’s success in unmanned aerial technologies has positioned it as a burgeoning drone-exporting nation within the transatlantic Alliance.
Indeed, Turkey’s drone warfare success, at least in the headlines, started with the Bayraktar TB-2’s combat record in Syria and Libya. Still, to grasp the Turkish drone warfare’s defense diplomacy dimension, one has to know more about other operators of the drone.
Both in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 has helped the operating countries, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, in the hard turning points of their respective quests. Having proven its combat performance, the TB-2 paved the way for a fruitful strategic collaboration with these nations. A series of cooperative production deals between the Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar, and Ukraine and Azerbaijan, respectively, stand out as important examples of such defense industry collaborations. More importantly, having capitalized on the TB-2’s combat performance, Baykar established defense companies in Kyiv and Baku. But these are not one-way journeys. The engine collaboration for the Kizilelma drone with Kyiv, for example, has opened a new chapter in Ukrainian-Turkish military ties. At present, Ukraine also eyes engine deals for Turkey’s manned combat aircraft segment.
In the manned aircraft segment, a careful assessment of Kaan’s export portfolio would explain Turkey’s defense diplomacy outlook for its advanced solutions. To keep the unit costs at manageable levels, Turkey needs to find lucrative deals to market the aircraft. Yet Kaan will enter an international market characterized by fierce competition. Therefore, transforming the Kaan into an attractive platform for clients seeking either enhanced fourth- or the more advanced fifth-generation fighter jets will be a critical priority, especially at a time when the F-35 dominates the Euro-Atlantic market and when other alternatives, such as the Rafale by Dassault Aviation of France and soon the South Korean KF-21 Boramae by Korea Aerospace Industries, are seeking to capture the remainder of the pie globally. SAAB’s Gripen, on the other hand, is losing its market share. All in all, Paris and Seoul are aiming to increase their market share in critical arms industries, indicating that Turkey will also face heavy competition. The Kaan could function as a geopolitical ledger that opens the path for new international partnerships. The combat aircraft will likely offer an effective solution to countries that cannot procure F-35s such as Pakistan or the Gulf Arab nations, due to a series of sensitive political impediments; though the latter may impinge on Seoul’s interest in selling its new Boramae. Another natural target for Turkey’s multirole combat solution would be militaries that want to replace their Soviet era-remnant arsenals with a defense ecosystem that is in line with NATO standards, such as the non-NATO former Soviet space, which has traditionally been Russia’s markets. In this regard, Azerbaijan and Ukraine loom large as two particularly interesting potential operator nations as Kaan’s export market slowly takes shape in the coming years.
The geopolitical showdown ahead
From a defense economics standpoint, Turkey’s serious air power projects, such as high-end drones and advanced manned aircraft, will also help the West to counterbalance its great power competitors in the international arms market. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Moscow and Beijing constituted around 16 percent and 5.2 percent of the global arms exports between 2018 and 2022, respectively, although the former’s share decreased following its stumbling invasion in Ukraine. Yet China continues to pose a real risk to the NATO members’ overall weapons market presence in several regions.
China has already snatched up the Middle Eastern drone market amid a long absence of American solutions due to restrictions. Turkey’s drone sales to the Gulf, and recently Egypt, offered a critical comeback to tackle the Chinese share in the unmanned aerial systems segment. In the coming years, China’s potential presence in the Middle Eastern manned aircraft market will be among the highest priorities to track. The Kaan can offer some help in this respect.
Therefore, it is important to note that, unlike popular speculations in the Turkish press, the Kaan will not compete with the F-35 head-on. Instead, it will introduce an alternative, NATO-grade solution in the manned aircraft segment that can be delivered to the nations that cannot purchase the F-35. While it will directly compete with the combat aircraft of Russia and China, both Korea and France will join the contest. The million-dollar question, for now, is about who will dominate the Gulf manned aircraft market in the absence of F-35.
Extending technology transfers in the drone warfare realm
Along with market opportunities, Turkey’s limits in arms transfers and coproduction deals remain key to understanding how the nation’s defense business will play out in the near term.
The Akinci is an interesting example, as it illustrates how the Turkish DTIB is evolving around high-end platforms. Akinci’s weapon systems configuration, featuring Turkey’s first aeroballistic missile, TRG-230-İHA, and a stand-off missile (SOM) baseline of cruise missiles, transforms the platform into a deep strike asset. The high-altitude long endurance (HALE) drone can also fly up to 40,000 feet (out of the engagement envelope of short-to-medium air defense systems). Looming large as one of the most capable platforms in the Turkish export portfolio, Akinci has started to leave a footprint in the international weapons market. In the summer of 2023, Baykar signed a historic export and coproduction deal with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries for local production and technology transfer. Roketsan and Aselsan, the primary manufacturers of the platform’s critical weapon systems configuration and sensors, were also included in the deals.
Baykar’s deal with the United Arab Emirates’ Edge Group to arm the Bayraktar TB-2 with Emirati payloads in early 2024 is another notable example. The procurement package marked the first instance of a Turkish drone maker certifying foreign munitions to be integrated into its platforms.
Last, having monitored the Ukrainian military’s successful TB-2 employment at the outset of the conflict, the TB-2 is also expanding its footprint in NATO markets. Following Poland, Romania has purchased the drone in a lucrative deal.
Next up
During the Cold War, Turkey—a NATO nation standing up to more than twenty Soviet Red Army divisions—remained a decades-long net arms importer. Thus, perhaps the country’s transformation into a key arms exporter, especially in advanced technologies such as drone warfare assets, has marked one of the most important developments in the Euro-Atlantic security affairs in the twenty-first century.
The Turkish model comes with successes and limitations. Turkey’s shipyards are now capable of designing principal surface combatants, frigates, and corvettes. In the submarine segment, however, especially in air-independent propulsion systems, Turkey’s needs foreign collaboration. Likewise, the Turkish defense industry can produce most of the land warfare solutions, albeit, the national tank program, Altay, still awaits its entry into the army’s arsenal. The aerial systems segment in not a different one compared to the naval and land warfare segments. In the air, the Turkish aerial drone design and production prowess is one of the best in the international weapons market. The manned aircraft segment, nonetheless, is lagging behind. As to high-end systems, manned or unmanned, engine configuration will continue to be troublesome for years to come. Turkey’s calculus goes well beyond merely becoming an off-the-shelf arms supplier. Ankara aims to establish deep-rooted ties in the market nations while paving the way to bring those nations’ capabilities to Turkey’s DTIB when possible, as is the case with the Ukrainian industries. Drones are still pioneering the Turkish defense outreach in the air. The path of Kaan, as well as the unmanned combat aircraft/loyal wingman projects, Kizilelma and Anka-3, will determine the final trajectory of the nation’s defense business outlook in the air.
Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.
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The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.