“Snow has fallen on the mountains you dreamed of.” This Turkish saying describes a situation where something that was long hoped for or dreamed of has finally become reality, but it comes with unexpected challenges, risks, or disappointments.
And this seems to be the situation in front of Turkey after Syrian rebel forces put an end to the 50-year-long Assad regime. On the one hand, what happened earlier this month probably went beyond any of Ankara’s “wildest dreams”: achieving regime change in Damascus, taming Russian and Iranian influence, curbing the “Kurdish threat” at its borders, and allowing for the mass return of Syrian refugees. On the other hand, however, things could go sideways. First, while its support for the Syrian National Army and contacts with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham provide Turkey with leverage in the future power transition in Syria, the challenge is to ensure that the puzzle fits together without drastic setbacks. Second, considering the uncertainty about the incoming Trump administration, yet to be seen is the role of Ankara’s competitors, especially pro-Kurdish groups such as the U.S.-backed People’s Protection Units and the Syrian Democratic Forces.
As a matter of fact, Turkey’s leadership seems to be satisfied with the latest developments. Nonetheless, as its regional equation implies facilitating a smooth sociopolitical transition in Damascus but also the fight against the “Kurdish terrorist corridor,” it is highly likely that this evolutionary phase will have significant implications for Turkey’s own Kurdish equation. Still to clarify is the extent to which the Syrian transition government led by Mohammed al Sharraa and Turkey’s objectives on the issue overlap. As the Turkish Foreign Ministry lately declared, “If they [the Syrian transition cabinet] address this issue properly, there would be no reason for us to intervene.” Yet, while this seems to confirm their embrace of a pluralistic vision for a “new” Syria, clashes might emerge on their respective position about the future of pro-Kurdish groups in the northeast.
Will the fall of Bashar al Assad re-open the Kurdish Pandora’s box? What is the interconnection between Turkish domestic and foreign policies on this matter? Ankara faces a dual path: seeking normalization to mitigate regional instability or risking escalation in Syria, which could reignite the securitized approach it has long applied to the Kurdish issue. With no clear roadmap and Syria’s situation in flux, the Kurdish issue looms large and is likely to remain an unresolved equation at the heart of Turkey’s domestic and regional math.
The Terms of Turkey’s Kurdish Equation
In Turkey, the Kurdish question historically resembles a Pandora’s box that can be opened, broken, or hidden in different periods by several actors and for multiple reasons. Indeed, Turkish citizens and observers of Turkish politics are accustomed to the cyclical phases of tension and rapprochement in the government’s relationship with the Kurds. Still, in October many were surprised when the Turkish government made a new call for normalization to various segments of the Kurdish leadership. It was surprising because it came from Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party. It was even more astonishing because it was directly addressed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and many Western countries — and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned by Turkey since 1999. Was it a genuine move to reverse the negative trend since the break of the peace process in 2015? Or is it just another strategy dictated by the political calculations of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party?
Meanwhile, as a twist of fate, some cells affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party conducted a terrorist attack in Ankara that same month, to which the government responded not only with an increase in military actions but also with a wave of re-securitization against pro-Kurdish and opposition political figures in Turkey. Is this also related to the broader ongoing international and regional instability? And, considering the uncertainties around the Syrian conundrum and a new Trump administration, what does the future hold for the Kurdish issue inside and outside Turkey?
Just Another Attempt at a Long Series?
“A Turk who does not like Kurds is not a Turk. A Kurd who does not like Turks is not a Kurd.” So said the leader of Turkey’s right-wing Nationalist Movement Party. This was an unlikely source as Bahçeli is well known for his harsh anti-Kurdish stance. A few days later, such appeasing words found an echo in a similar conciliatory tone in Erdoğan’s public statements, yet with less vigor and more caution in differentiating between “Kurdish brothers” and “those terrorists in Syria and Iraq.”
As we have argued elsewhere, this seems to confirm that the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurdish political and military representatives is characterized by an intertwining between the external and internal dimensions. On the one hand, Erdoğan and his party have a two-decades-long history of ebbs and flows with the Kurdish question. While up to the early 2010s, his governments endeavored to follow a path of accommodation and dialogue, the last 10 years have been witness to a return to a re-securitization within and outside Turkey’s borders. On the other hand, Kurdish parties and non-state actors like the Kurdistan Workers Party — a left-wing militant group founded in the 1980s — have undergone numerous alterations but have proved resilient.
This attempt at a resolution is just the latest of a long series of attempts to cope with a structural open question for the Turkish state. As early as 2009, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan proposed an initiative known as the “Kurdish Opening.” Despite the ups and downs in this complicated process, the government and intelligence services made similar attempts until 2015, a year that dramatically ended the peace overture. The collapse of dialogue prompted the restart of “trench wars” in Turkey’s southeastern regions, further exacerbated by the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war.
Almost a decade later, his ruling coalition is now weakened by an ongoing economic crisis and a decline in votes. Therefore, at first glance, broadening the voter base through reconciliation with particular segments of the Kurdish communities could arguably represent a political strategy for Erdoğan’s immediate and long-term political objectives. This is plausible, considering he is a pragmatic leader who can turn the country’s volatile context and sociopolitical polarization in his favor. His party needs additional support to secure a parliamentary majority to amend the constitution, which currently limits the presidential mandate to two terms, allowing him to run in the 2028 presidential elections.
Nevertheless, reaching and engaging the various components of Kurdish society remains a formidable challenge. One should recall that the Kurdish electorate and political factions are far from monolithic. On one side are those who identify themselves with the principles of the People’s Equality and Democracy Party, where there are still figures following the leadership of Öcalan and those trying to gain broader leftist-leaning appeal, even among non-Kurdish voters. On the other side are more traditionalist and conservative groups that have historically supported Erdoğan’s party and, as some sources told us, now “appear to be the most surprised by government’s search for dialogue.” In this sense, Erdoğan sees an opportunity to exploit these internal divisions within the Kurdish electorate, seeking to win over more moderate and conservative segments without alienating the government’s nationalist supporters.
The Kurdish Question as the Opposition’s Kryptonite
The Erdoğan-Bahçeli duo’s “divide-and-rule strategy” not only strengthens their domestic position but also serves to marginalize the Republican People’s Party, the main opposition party. Indeed, forcing it to take potentially divisive stances on Kurdish issues is likely to foment dissent between its liberal and more nationalist factions. This also represents a way to discredit the opposition whenever its leaders open up to Kurdish counterparts by accusing them of talking with “terrorists.” As such, Bahçeli’s recent statements suggesting reconciliation with Öcalan seem part of this broader political calculation. Yet, as close observers noted, this move is likely coordinated with Erdoğan, aiming to present Erdoğan’s administration as open to dialogue while maintaining a pragmatic and tactical distance. In this way, Erdoğan retains the flexibility to step back should public opinion turn against the idea, avoiding the political fallout from previous failed Kurdish outreach attempts and leaving open the possibility of using the state’s “heavy hand.”
This is what happened after the events in Ankara in October 2024, when the Kurdistan Workers Party launched a terrorist attack on TUSAŞ, one of Turkey’s leading aerospace companies. Domestically, the government used the event as a pretext to take severe measures against Kurdish-affiliated political figures and municipalities. Recent actions include the dismissal of the Republican People Party’s mayor of Kurdish origins in Istanbul’s Esenyurt district for alleged terrorist links, as well as the imposition of trustees and investigations against 37 pro-Kurdish party mayors. Such measures reflect a longstanding practice in southeastern Turkey, where the government has frequently replaced elected officials with appointed trustees in Kurdish-majority areas. Yet, this comes with a political cost. This practice is becoming increasingly unacceptable also among some ruling members of parliament. They view it as one of the key reasons behind the party’s consistent loss of support in predominantly Kurdish-populated areas over the years. At the same time, this might also help the incumbent rulers to satisfy the demands of those conservative Kurds who do not feel represented by the People’s Equality and Democracy Party’s leftist and progressive positions.
An Olive Branch Is Not For Everyone
Offering an “olive branch” to Öcalan has not precluded Ankara from intensifying its military operations against pro-Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, the Kurdistan Workers Party’s activities extend across borders, where the actions of its affiliated groups impact both Turkey’s domestic politics and relations with neighboring states. Bahçeli himself has declared that “Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem, nor will there ever be. The existing problem is the problem of separatist terrorism, and this betrayal will definitely be rooted out.” That is why some argue that this latest peace proposal by the Turkish government is just a way to disentangle the different components of the Kurdish equation.
First, especially within the context of Israel’s war on Hamas, the recent toppling of Assad, and the ongoing instability in the Middle East, Turkey is playing a delicate match. On the one hand, Erdoğan’s government is leveraging the situation to reinforce its position towards its domestic and regional audience. On the other, securing the country from potential spillover effects remains a security priority.
Overall, Erdoğan is aware that these dynamics could increase the Kurds’ strategic value if other actors exploit Kurdish factions to advance their agendas. Israel’s increased military activism is part of a broader strategy to dismantle Iran’s “axis of resistance.” A senior member of the Kurdistan Workers Party declared on Nov. 14 that, while condemning Israel’s policies, the establishment of relations is not excluded. Thus, Turkey fears that the group could be similarly weaponized by rival powers, adding urgency to Ankara’s efforts to neutralize it domestically and regionally.
Second, Erdoğan likely interprets the current moment as an opportunity to address Turkey’s Kurdish issue by securing broader regional support. In Iraq, Ankara has sought to bolster counter-terrorism cooperation by persuading Baghdad to officially label the Kurdistan Workers Party as a terrorist organization. However, the anticipated collaboration has not yet materialized. Recent developments suggest that Iraq plans to organize a security conference involving Turkey, Iran, and Syria to address the issue. This could also rely on the support of Kurdistan Region President Nerchirvan Barzani, who recently noted that this would mark the beginning of a new promising process. Nonetheless, much will now depend on the transition administration in Syria.
Lastly, the presence of nearly four million Syrian refugees in Turkey has also turned into a political liability for Erdogan’s government. This is even more true in light of the current developments in Syria. The takeover by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham positions Ankara as the primary interlocutor with the new administration. One of Turkey’s stated objectives is to put an end to Kurdish terrorism originating from Syria, specifically from the People’s Defense Units. Surely, Ankara might want to capitalize on this eventual favorable sliding-door scenario. Syria has long been a pivotal factor in shaping Turkey’s domestic politics, and the current situation presents a golden opportunity for Ankara.
The Trump Factor
Much also hinges on developments at the international level. While major players like the United States and Russia might have diverted their attention to other more urgent scenarios, their moves and influence still maintain the power to restrict or enlarge other regional players’ margin of maneuver. Above all, Washington’s longstanding support for the Syrian Democratic Forces and the People’s Protection Units has heavily strained its relations with Ankara. Hence, a key consideration for Turkey is the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. Trump’s previous administration took steps to withdraw American forces from Syria, providing Turkey with more margin of maneuver for military interventions.
That is why many in Ankara viewed Trump’s re-election for a second term in the White House positively, with Erdoğan referring to him as a friend in his congratulatory message. However, this cautiously optimistic atmosphere waned with the “not super Turkey-friendly” first appointments the upcoming Trump administration made. Marco Rubio, appointed secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, named as national security advisor, are two figures who could further complicate relations between Ankara and Washington. The former is known for his positions close to the Gülenists, followers of Fethullah Gülen, who recently passed away but is considered the mastermind behind the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. The latter is recognized for his general anti-Turkey stance and strong support for the Kurdish cause and Kurdish groups in the Middle East.
Peace or Endless Waves of Securitization?
Since the breakdown of the peace process in 2015, the Kurdish question has experienced waves of securitization. The recent terrorist attack in Ankara underscores the volatility of the issue, which can be easily and quickly transformed from a political question to a matter of national security and foreign policy. In the near term, the oscillation between politicizing and securitizing the Kurdish issue is likely to continue, deepening polarization within Turkish society and heightening the risk of security escalations in sensitive regions, as Syria shows.
Domestically, there are the incumbent government’s political calculations and dividends. Recent developments have revealed that certain factions within the Kurdistan Workers Party have no intention of accepting a deal proposed by Erdoğan, whom they view as an autocrat incapable of making the necessary concessions. This depends on whether the upcoming talks between the pro-Kurdish party’s chairpersons and Öcalan will cease the guerrillas’ modus operandi in favor of a political solution. Yet, should this not work out, these contrasts might result in the emergence of new and radical figures in the Kurdistan Workers Party, further complicating the prospects for a viable resolution. Finally, solving the equation is also a matter of alignment and cooperation between Kurdish and other opposition leaders. A critical factor could be the Republican People’s Party’s willingness to move away from nationalist rhetoric and foster collaboration with the pro-Kurdish party as tried since the 2019 municipal elections.
At the domestic-regional nexus, the alleged divergent views between the Iraqi and Syrian divisions of the Kurdistan Workers Party also underscore how Öcalan likely no longer possesses the full ability to influence the entirety of the movement. While the founder has called on the movement’s members to lay down their weapons, some stick with the original violent tactics. On the regional front, much will depend on developments in Syria, especially the progress of the transitional government and the role that Ankara could play. Furthermore, it will take several months to discern how the United States intends to manage its stance on the matter and its broader Middle Eastern policies. This might result in new green lights from Trump for Turkish military operations, as in 2019, or a more proactive stance in which Washington could promote this renovated peace process to avoid any further escalation during the power transition in Syria. For a start, the United States could try to press the Syrian Democratic Forces to clearly detach from the Kurdistan Workers Party’s violent positions and overtly stand for Syria’s territorial integrity. In this regard, it is unpredictable whether the latest alleged preoccupation in Washington about limiting the scope of Kurdish autonomy would also address some of Turkey’s concerns. However, it will be challenging to appease Turkey’s position on the security side of the equation, as demonstrated by the recent military build-up across the areas dominated by Kurdish groups. First, Ankara views the party founded by Öcalan and its Syrian offshoot as part of the same movement, and the country’s nationalistic milieu makes it unthinkable for Turkish leaders to accept any sort of empowerment of Kurdish zones inside Syria. Second, it is worth noting that any increase in the Turkish army’s military operations against Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria triggers a rally-around-the-flag effect within Turkish society that helps the government draw bipartisan support against an evergreen matter of “national survival.”
Nevertheless, with no roadmap in sight and the uncertain situation in Syria, the Kurdish issue will remain a central and unresolved challenge influencing Turkey’s domestic politics, regional strategies, and international relations. Whether Pandora’s box reopens, remains sealed, or shatters largely depends on these three elements of the equation aligning or continuing to diverge.
Samuele C. A. Abrami is a Mercator-Istanbul Policy Center fellow. He is about to obtain his Ph.D. from the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan, where he is also a lecturer for the Masters in Middle Eastern Studies. Besides Turkish foreign policy, his research focuses on the E.U. foreign policy, Turkish politics, the Kurdish issue, and climate change in the Middle East and North Africa. A member of the Turkey Europe Future Forum, Samuele was also a visiting fellow at Sabancı University and the Stockholm Institute for Turkish Studies.
Riccardo Gasco is a Ph.D. candidate at Bologna University and Foreign Policy Program coordinator at IstanPol Institute in Istanbul, as well as a visiting research fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center. He holds a degree in international relations from the University of Genoa and the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. His research focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy between NATO and Russia. He has published on Turkish foreign policy, domestic politics, the Kurdish issue, Turkish-E.U. relations, the Middle East, and trans-Atlantic relations.
Image: Staff Sgt. Raymond Boyington
