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Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
The writer is director of the Turkey programme at the Middle East Institute and author of ‘Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria’
Half a century of rule by the Assad family in Syria collapsed astonishingly quickly after insurgents burst out of a rebel-held enclave and took Damascus in a matter of days. For Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, it was not fast enough. He has been waiting for this moment since the Syrian uprising in 2011 and is determined to reap the benefits of Bashar al-Assad’s ousting ahead of Turkey’s 2028 elections.
Erdoğan has two big problems that a post-Assad Syria might help him solve. First, the constitution does not allow him to run for another term as president in 2028. To fix that, he has been seeking the support of the pro-Kurdish party, which has enough seats in parliament when added to his own to enable him to change the constitution. With that in mind, Erdoğan has started talks with the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK). Recent developments in Syria may help him further.
The Syrian Kurdish theatre has always had an impact on Turkey’s Kurdish problem and Erdoğan’s plans to consolidate his autocratic rule. In 2014, when Ankara was holding peace talks with the PKK to secure Kurdish backing for Erdoğan’s bid to establish an executive presidency, Turkey’s Kurds took to the streets. They were protesting his failure to act against an impending Isis attack on the Kurdish-controlled northern Syrian town of Kobani. Barack Obama, then US president, pleaded for Ankara’s help but Erdoğan was reluctant. He thought helping the Syrian Kurds would strengthen the PKK’s hand in negotiations and complicate his plans.
Indeed, the subsequent victory of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defence Units (YPG) made Kobani a symbol of Kurdish national aspirations, boosted the group’s image abroad and paved the way for a partnership with the US. These developments emboldened Turkey’s Kurds, as well. Shortly after, Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party launched a campaign to block Erdoğan’s power grab, winning a historic victory in June 2015 and denying his party a parliamentary majority for the first time.
A decade on, Erdoğan finds himself once again trying to convince the Kurds to back his plans to remain in power. Experience tells him that weakening the Syrian Kurds is necessary to achieve that, and Assad’s fall now gives him the perfect opportunity.
Since the Assad regime was overthrown, Turkish proxies, supported by Turkish air strikes, have captured territory in northern Syria from the US-backed Kurdish militia. Erdoğan was previously unable to do this due to objections from Assad, his allies Iran and Russia, and the US. With Assad gone, his allies weakened and an incoming American president who thinks the US should stay out of Syria, Erdoğan now has a free hand to deal with the Syrian Kurds. A diminished YPG will certainly aid his plans to secure Kurdish support at home.
Assad’s removal will help with Erdoğan’s second major problem as well. The growing nationalist backlash against the millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey has undermined his support. Erdoğan has long sought Assad’s co-operation to repatriate them but Assad dragged his feet. With him gone, the refugees may return home voluntarily. Things are unlikely to go as smoothly as Erdoğan wants them to, but this will not stop him from telling his supporters that he solved the problem.
Erdoğan sees nothing but opportunities in Syria. The last time he was this hopeful about the country was in 2011 after the uprising began. He thought Assad would be toppled “within weeks” and that an Islamist-led government would take its place, making Turkey a kingmaker. Instead, Turkey ended up with the world’s largest refugee population, an expansive Isis network that killed hundreds and a severely damaged international image. Syria may once again dash Erdoğan’s hopes.