The past year saw faint signs of a thaw between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, with indirect talks and back-channel diplomacy suggesting a tentative effort to address mutual security concerns, particularly regarding Kurdish forces in northern Syria. But these attempts, which did not result in a significant shift in Turkey’s Syria policy, are no longer immediately relevant following the recent fall of the Assad regime. After years of a delicate balancing act between its membership in anti-Assadist NATO and its alliances with Assad-aligned Iran and Russia, Turkey must now figure out how to develop its Syria policy amid a quickly changing reality.
“Turkey’s primary concern has always been preventing a continuous Kurdish-controlled border from Iraq to the Mediterranean,” French political scientist Jean Marcou told The Media Line. “This goal has driven its military interventions in Syria.”
Turkey saw control over eastern Syria by the Democratic Union Party, a Kurdish political party, as a threat, Marcou said. To prevent the potential establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region, Turkey was willing to enter into a coalition with organizations like the Islamic State group.
Both the US and Europe have supported the Kurdish rebels as part of an attempt to contain Assad and Iran’s influence in Syria.
Ankara was once aligned with Western and Gulf states that supported the Syrian opposition, but it eventually came to align with Russia and Iran. Alongside Russia and Iran, Turkey sponsored the Astana peace process, an attempt launched in 2017 to find a political solution to the crisis in Syria.
“The Astana process aimed to stabilize Syria by dividing it into de-escalation zones, with Turkey, Russia, and Iran overseeing different regions. However, it collapsed under the pressures of war, leaving Idlib as the only functional buffer zone,” Marcou said.
Marcou said that Turkey is performing a juggling act in its attempt to maintain ties with its NATO allies while simultaneously pursuing partnerships with Russia and Iran. “This dual strategy defines Turkey’s complex foreign policy, with Syria becoming its testing ground. When NATO didn’t intervene in the Syrian conflict, Turkey sought solutions with Russia and Iran despite their support for Assad,” he said.
Turkey is pushing for rebel groups to take power
Turkey previously violated the terms of the Astana peace process by supporting Western powers’ anti-Assad forces like the National Front for Liberation, the Free Syrian Army, and the Syrian National Army. Currently, Turkey is pushing rebel groups to take over Syria, especially those from Tahrir al-Sham, a group associated with al-Qaida.
That strategy has serious ramifications for Iran and Russia’s position. Marcou said that Russia’s loss of key bases like Tartus would diminish Russian influence on the region, leaving a vacuum for Turkey to fill.
“Iran’s declining role in Syria, exacerbated by Turkey’s support for opposition forces, further cements Turkey’s position as a dominant regional power that will manage to dictate Syria’s future and even the regional one,” Marcou said.
He said that Turkey’s balancing approach between East and West contributes to its influence in Syria and in the region overall.
As rebels gained territory in Syria over the past few days, residents celebrated the fall of the regime and joyfully welcomed the liberating force. But questions remain about the fate of Syria and its citizens, particularly those from minority groups.
“The moderate signs and actions so far are encouraging,” Berkay Mandiraci, senior Turkey analyst at the International Crisis Group, told The Media Line.
Mandiraci said that the Tahrir al-Sham rebel organization is seeking international legitimacy, which gives Western nations leverage over the group. “They should start thinking about how to use their leverage wisely to help Syria get back on its feet,” Mandiraci said.
Joe Young, director of the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, described Turkey’s position in the Syrian conflict as “multifaceted.”
“They back some rebels but not others, especially the Kurdish-based ones, whom they hate. This makes the situation incredibly complicated because Turkey’s objectives are not aligned with all the groups fighting Assad,” he said.
He said that the fall of Assad may lead to another civil war due to the disparate ideologies of the rebel groups.
If an Islamist group takes over, it might impose harsh Islamic law and persecute minority groups, he added. “While some Islamist groups claim to have moderated, it’s unclear if this is genuine or strategic,” he said.
In an attempt to secure Western support, the rebels have balanced their revolutionary fervor with a promotion of institutional stability, Marcou said. That balancing act is evident in the preservation of some symbolic structures, like the Prime Minister’s Office, alongside the destruction of regime symbols.
Western powers face a complex set of challenges as they respond to these developments. The future of Syria hinges on whether moderate factions can maintain control or if more extremist groups will rise to prominence.
Marcou said that Western powers may see the fall of Assad as strategically beneficial in the West’s attempt to counter Iran. “But the emergence of a jihadist regime would pose significant security challenges for Europe,” he said.
The importance of Turkey in Syria and the region is likely to increase, Mandiraci said. “Ankara supports Syria’s territorial integrity and would like to see a stable Syria with which it can develop constructive relations in the future,” he said.
But whether a stable Syria will emerge remains to be seen. Young said that no major power or coalition is willing to enable a democratic solution in the country. “That’s the unfortunate reality since the Kurdish rebels will not prevail given the current circumstances,” he said.
