What does Turkey gain from the rebel offensive in Syria?

In a surprising turn of events, the defensive line of the Bashar al-Assad regime (supported by Iran and Russia) in northern Syria collapsed. This allowed Syrian rebels to enter Aleppo, the country’s economic heart, followed by Hama. The rebel coalition, consisting of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), has significantly altered the dynamics of the conflict in Syria since 2020. The precise role of Turkey in this situation remains a topic of speculation. However, one thing is clear. Even though Turkey has not been directly involved, its greenlight of the offensive is based on its core interests in Syria. As a result, Turkey has now positioned itself as the most influential foreign actor in the country.

The rebel offensive took many by surprise, but analysts familiar with the situation in Syria were aware that the rebels were prepared to launch it by mid-October. At that time, Turkey rejected the offensive, as Ankara was focused on diplomatic efforts to communicate with Damascus. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made several overtures to Assad, demonstrating Turkey’s willingness to engage in dialogue.

The talks, however, did not progress. Damascus interpreted Turkey’s rhetoric as a sign of weakness. The Assad regime, bolstered by its strengthening relationships with Arab states and ongoing discussions in Europe about normalizing relations, insisted on the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. This demand is a nonstarter for Ankara, as it would likely lead to a surge of new Syrian refugees heading toward Turkey and would jeopardize Turkey’s national security strategy against the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). (The PKK is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, NATO, and Turkey.)

Damascus has shown no interest in discussing the resettlement of refugees returning to Syria. Russia and Iran, the primary supporters of the Assad regime, have not leveraged their influence to encourage Damascus to adopt a more constructive approach.

In the end, Moscow delivered the final blow to the diplomatic process. Following the last Astana summit—attended by Turkey, Iran, and Russia in November—the Russian special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, expressed strong opposition to any Turkish cross-border military operations against the YPG. A few days later, Russia labeled Turkey as an occupying force in Syria. It demanded the withdrawal of Turkish military personnel from Syria, called for an end to Turkish support for the Syrian opposition, and stated that a meeting between Erdogan and Assad was not feasible at this time.

Ankara realized that it could not persuade Damascus to join negotiations regarding a political solution in Syria. As a result, it decided to give the Syrian rebels the greenlight for which they had been waiting. As soon as a ceasefire in Lebanon was announced on November 27, the rebels promptly launched their offensive. Syrian rebels saw their opportunity to advance as Iran weakened in Syria and Hezbollah focused on Lebanon without being accused of collaboration with Israel.

Nobody anticipated the Syrian rebels’ incredible progress, including the rebels themselves. The collapse of the Assad forces in Aleppo allowed for significantly greater gains than were initially expected. When the Assad regime started handing over territory to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Turkish-backed SNA initiated a second operation from the Turkish-protected safe zone in northern Aleppo. The SNA successfully severed the connection between Manbij and Tel Rifaat and captured the strategic Kuweires airbase, ultimately gaining control of Tel Rifaat.

With the YPG’s collapse, the SNA took control of the same area from which the Russians refused to withdraw, which initially prompted Turkey to approve this offensive—an outcome no one had anticipated.

As of the date of writing, the military situation in Syria is dynamic. It remains uncertain what will happen after the regime’s newly established defensive line in northern Hama will fail to hold off the rebels’ advance. It also remains to be seen where diplomatic talks will go. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Ankara and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, but the escalation in Syria continued.

Turkey has three primary objectives in Syria and has made strides in advancing them. The first goal is to achieve a political solution based on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. Before the offensive, many believed that Damascus could be normalized and reintegrated into the international system. However, it is now evident that peace will not be restored in Syria if the needs and demands of the Syrian people and the opposition are overlooked.

Turkey also aims to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their home country. The refugee situation has become a significant domestic political issue, influencing electoral behavior. Turkey sees a promising opportunity with the capture of Aleppo and its surrounding areas; Aleppo has the necessary housing, infrastructure, and economic conditions to support the return of refugees.

Returns to Syria will only reach the desired level if security chaos is avoided and relative safety is established. The experience of refugee returns in Syria is that they return to areas controlled by Syrian rebels, not the regime. Consequently, various options—including collaborations with the European Union and the United Nations—may soon become negotiation topics.

The third goal is to ensure Turkey’s national security by eliminating the threat from the YPG. The nearly decade-long Russian protection of the YPG in Tel Rifaat has been lifted. Turkey now has more options to either initiate a new military operation against the YPG or to support another offensive by the SNA.

Turkey has also gained significant leverage on the diplomatic front. Turkey will likely use the current situation in Syria to negotiate more effectively with Moscow and Tehran, and has an opportunity to secure a deal with the incoming Donald Trump administration.

President-elect Trump and his team likely noticed how Turkish policies reversed years of Iranian investments in Syria within just four days. A Trump administration that aims to withdraw from Syria must collaborate with Turkey.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Further reading

Image: Rebel factions successfully seized control of the city of Aleppo, Syria, on November 30, 2024, after intense clashes and fierce battles with Assad regime forces. (Photo by Rami Alsayed/NurPhoto)NO USE FRANCE