Turkish initiative in AANES basket – Enab Baladi

Khaled al-Jeratli | Ali Darwish

The call made by the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahçeli, for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), listed as a terrorist organization, to engage in dialogue, represents a turning point in the course of events within Turkey, with expected repercussions in northeastern Syria, where Kurdish parties, viewed by Ankara as extensions of the PKK, dominate.

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), Turkey’s primary goal in Syria over the years, has positioned itself at the heart of Turkish domestic developments, linking the current escalation against it in several statements to shifts in this initiative.

Since October 23, the northeastern region of Syria has been subjected to continuous bombardment by Turkish forces, targeting military positions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military arm of AANES, as well as infrastructure and service facilities.

The Turkish nationalist initiative awaits an announcement from the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, for the dissolution of the organization and a commitment to solely engage in political work after years of armed conflict against the Turkish government. While the details and gains or losses for the parties remain unclear, Öcalan’s preliminary acceptance places the ball in the court of AANES in Syria, which has been at odds with Turkey for years.

While Ankara’s openness to the PKK may increase pressure on the Syrian side, it also creates opportunities for AANES to become part of this understanding, potentially lifting the shadow of ongoing military operations and persistent pressure from regional powers.

Enab Baladi discusses in this lengthy report, with experts and researchers, ways to ensure the success of the Turkish initiative for the Kurdish parties, and the likelihood of its impact on northeastern Syria, at a time when Turkish military operations in the region remain active.

On October 22, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, invited imprisoned PKK founding leader Abdullah Öcalan to address Parliament, announcing the end of “terrorism” in exchange for gaining the right to “hope.”

Bahçeli launched this unprecedented call during a parliamentary session, noting his previously sharp stance against Öcalan and his party, having previously demanded Öcalan’s execution under the same parliamentary dome.

Bahçeli stated during his invitation to Öcalan, “If the isolation on him (Öcalan) is lifted, he should come and speak at a meeting of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) in the Turkish Parliament and announce that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been dissolved.”

He added that legal regulations regarding the ‘right to hope’ should be established, and pathways must be opened for people to benefit from it, indicating that Öcalan could also benefit if he demonstrates “cunning” and “determination” in a meeting with the DEM Party in Parliament.

Turkish media has described this initiative as historic, garnering reactions from Kurdish politicians, government opponents, and supporters alike.

Öcalan received the Turkish initiative and expressed his readiness to transfer the ongoing conflict between his party and Turkey from a “conflict and violence ground to a legal and political ground if the conditions are right.”

What is the PKK?

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is an armed Kurdish organization established in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and a group of Kurdish youth in Turkey.

The party’s initial goal was to establish an independent Kurdish state encompassing areas with a Kurdish majority in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Since the 1980s, the PKK has been embroiled in a long struggle with the Turkish government, beginning with armed confrontations and later transforming into attacks and military operations, the latest of which was an attack on a military company in Ankara a day following the Nationalist Movement Initiative.

Ankara and the PKK have engaged in rounds of negotiations for peace, the last of which escalated into fighting in 2015 after negotiations collapsed.

Turkey, along with several countries such as the United States and the European Union, classifies the PKK as a terrorist organization.

Abdullah Öcalan was arrested in 1999 in Kenya through a Turkish intelligence operation, accused of treason and for founding the PKK, Turkey’s traditional nemesis.

The Syrian regime and its late president, Hafez al-Assad, were accused of facilitating Öcalan’s extradition, who was residing in Syria prior to the operation, in a deal that ended tensions between Ankara and Damascus.

The Syrian regime provided Öcalan with weapons and funding in its conflict with Turkey, which responded by pressing Syria over water resources and threatening military action before reaching the Adana Agreement in 1998.

Separation between internal and external issues

The Turkish initiative did not address the status of entities that Ankara considers extensions of the PKK and fights against, such as the SDF in Syria, but it proposed an agreement to resolve internal issues in Turkey.

The prospect of a new round of peace talks between the government and the PKK remains uncertain; it’s unpredictable what the talks may encompass or how far they may progress, despite indicators suggesting that some progress has been made in this regard, according to Osama Sheikh Ali, a researcher specialized in sub-state actors at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.

The researcher told Enab Baladi that there are indications that Turkey is gradually announcing the results of the initiative to prepare public opinion.

He added that military operations are still ongoing against the SDF in both Syria and Iraq, and military forces remain positioned at conflict zones, suggesting that Ankara may favor separating the two issues (internal and external).

Ankara is expected to try and solve internal issues apart from the PKK’s activities abroad, according to Sheikh Ali, as it needs a strong domestic front in light of a “heated” regional situation. Turkey views the PKK as an issue that can be resolved by calling for disarmament, thereby closing this file. The researcher noted that regarding the external file, Turkey may continue its counter-terrorism efforts abroad, treating it as a separate issue, particularly with the presence of an entity in northeastern Syria that requires engagement.

On her part, Dilara Aslan, the head of the Daily Sabah newspaper office in Ankara, believes that the primary goal and priority of the peace process is to unify Turkey internally and “eradicate terrorism in the country.”

She told Enab Baladi that Ankara wants to maintain its internal strength and unity in the face of any potential escalation or migration crises in the Middle East, and does not want to deal with terrorism in such scenarios.

Elements of the PKK in the mountains of Turkey (YouTube)

Potential impact on Syria

Over the past years, Turkey has prevented the Autonomous Administration, supported by Washington in northeastern Syria, from achieving stability in the region it has managed since 2015. The Turkish veto has been a key factor preventing AANES from gaining any recognition to date, despite its persistent efforts.

AANES and its military arm, the SDF, have over the years invited Turkey to dialogue, stating that there is no link between their political and military entities and the PKK, yet there has been no change in the Turkish response.

Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali believes that any improvement or peace between the Turkish government and the PKK would have positive repercussions in other regions, whether in Iraq or specifically in northeastern Syria due to the PKK’s dominance there.

He told Enab Baladi that Ankara remains opposed to the continuation or formation of a military entity like the SDF or a political one like the Autonomous Administration under the absolute control of PKK arms and will fight the success of such a project.

The impact of the initiative on Syria remains contingent on the nature of any understanding that may arise between the parties in Turkey, but it is expected that Turkey will work to reduce the Democratic Union Party’s dominance over decision-making in northeastern Syria and allow for other parties to engage in political participation there.

Osama Sheikh Ali, Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies

Dilara Aslan, head of the Daily Sabah newspaper office in Ankara, believes that when the Turkish government decided to initiate a new peace process, it certainly considered all scenarios and active parties in the region.

She told Enab Baladi that the primary active players in this process are the four main parties in Turkey (the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, former co-chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş, Qandil Mountain, one of the prominent strongholds of the PKK in Iraq, and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.

She considered that all the active parties, except for Qandil and northeastern Syria, currently support this process publicly, but on the other hand, conflicting signals come from Qandil and northeastern Syria to preserve their bargaining positions.

According to Aslan, Syria is of secondary importance in the current proposal due to Ankara’s greater focus on its internal issues. Ultimately, the repercussions in Syria will depend on the conduct of the negotiation process and the regional political dynamics within Syria.

The Turkish government, when making the recent decision to initiate a new Kurdish peace process, certainly took into account all scenarios and active players, especially since President Erdoğan is not the kind of leader who initiates such controversial policies without preparatory work behind them.

Turkish journalist Dilara Aslan, Head of the Daily Sabah newspaper office in Ankara

When discussing the Kurdish issue in the region before 2012, the focus was mainly on Iraq, where the Kurdistan region enjoys autonomy within the Iraqi state, and on Turkey, which has engaged in political and military conflicts with Kurdish parties both within and outside its borders for decades.

Meanwhile, Syria witnessed political movements over the past decades from dozens of Kurdish parties, which were met with repression by the Syrian regime, as demonstrated by the confrontations that began in Qamishli in 2004.

The rise of the Democratic Union Party

The Kurdish political and military presence in Syria became significantly evident and influential in the region after the Syrian revolution in 2011, which followed a divergence of positions from both Kurdish components and parties, the regime, and the opposition.

The withdrawal of the Syrian regime in 2012 from areas in northeastern Syria, where Kurds make up a significant portion of the population, left behind weapons from military units of the army, which were taken over by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). This was followed by political and military developments that transformed Syria into a central arena in the Kurdish issue.

The first seed for the establishment of the SDF was planted when the Democratic Union Party worked to consolidate its power and control over the region administratively and militarily, at the expense of other Kurdish parties, some of which engaged in the political bodies of the Syrian opposition.

The Democratic Union Party is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as several leaders and members from the main organization moved to Syria and became key players in the SDF to this day. Notable figures currently known to Syrians include Mazloum Abdi, the leader of the SDF, and Ilham Ahmad, the co-chair of the Foreign Relations Department in AANES (the political umbrella for the SDF).

The participation of the People’s Protection Units in battles against the Islamic State group, especially in the city of Ain al-Arab/Kobanî, located on the Turkish border in 2014, and receiving support from the International Coalition, granted them greater presence and strength. They announced the establishment of the Autonomous Administration and its military wing the Syrian Democratic Forces in October 2015, which includes Arab, Kurdish, and Assyrian factions, although the Kurdish units form its backbone and main control.

The SDF consists of two wings, both of which are led by members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The first is hardline and represents the cadres of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that still adhere to the party’s ideology, while the second is more open, represented by Mazloum Abdi and other members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party like Ilham Ahmad.

According to a study by researcher Samer al-Ahmed at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, it can be said theoretically that the decision-making mechanism in the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other institutions of AANES follows the political offices and co-presidencies, and is reviewed by the General Council composed of representatives from regions, parties, and personalities, based on the principle of participation and consensus. However, information indicates that the leadership of the Democratic Union Party often monopolizes decisions without the knowledge of other parties.

There are no specific estimates of the number of SDF fighters, but its leader Mazloum Abdi said last July that the number exceeds 100,000 fighters, “who possess and use the latest military technology and have established their special forces and created strongholds and fortifications,” according to Abdi.

The SDF enjoys diverse (security, military, and financial) support from the International Coalition since the beginning of its operations against the Islamic State, and its forces undergo security and military training overseen by the coalition led by Washington.

Transformations in favor of the SDF

Ibrahim Kaban, director of the Geostrategic Studies Center, believes that the dramatic transformations in the Middle East have drawn significant attention to the Autonomous Administration from Western powers.

Kaban said to Enab Baladi that the matter is related to the strategic importance of the location, forces, and organization of the SDF, as well as the existing capabilities and ideology within it, which all contribute to making it strategically important to the United States, especially since the areas under the Autonomous Administration contain most of Syria’s energy resources, from oil and gas, and it can self-finance.

Regarding the transformations that have been in favor of the SDF, Kaban summarized them in several points:

• The conditions surrounding the presence of American forces and the International Coalition in Iraq, which are being targeted by some armed groups affiliated with Iran.
• “The inadequacy of the Turkish approach” regarding developments in the Middle East and the rapprochement occurring between Turkey and Russia.
• The American presence seeking to control geopolitical transition points in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq, especially with the Iranian presence in the region and its expansion towards Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
• The concerns in the Gulf Arab countries regarding Iranian expansion, and their demand and pressure on the United States “to perform its leading role” in preventing this expansion at the expense of Arab states.
• The United States’ need for places to establish its presence outside Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, as the presence in Syria and Iraq necessitates that it address the issue through the lens of Syria.

Any political or military movement in the Middle East plays on two strings: one hardline and the other open. This can be observed in Turkey and most countries in the region, where the hardline current aims to tighten the grip while the other leans towards a loose grip, a strategy for dealing that governs the diplomacy of the region.

Ibrahim Kaban, Director of the Geostrategic Studies Center

Members of the SDF – March 23, 2021 (AFP)

Repeatedly, the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria, along with its military wing “SDF,” has shown readiness for dialogue with all parties, including Turkey, as they face tighter constraints amidst the Turkish rapprochement with the Syrian regime.

The willingness to engage in dialogue does not represent a radical change, as the Autonomous Administration has long stated its readiness for dialogue, aiming for a solution that satisfies all parties, but these comments have always been conditional.

Obstacles in Syria

With what seems to be progress in the rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus, which Turkey hopes will thwart the project of the Autonomous Administration, along with attacks faced by the SDF in eastern Deir Ezzor, the activities of the Islamic State, and expectations of a US withdrawal should Donald Trump return to the presidency, the Autonomous Administration is seeking a way out.

From the Turkish side, Ankara’s policy has gone through numerous turns in Syria, from supporting democratic transformation to a security-military strategy focused on securing its borders and combating “terrorism” through direct military intervention and supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the SDF, culminating in rapprochement with the regime.

Ankara understands, according to an assessment published by the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, that the issues on the table for its rapprochement with the regime are complex and exceed the capabilities of both sides to achieve, as local, regional, and international actors’ interests intertwine in Syria.

Despite the official positions issued by the Autonomous Administration, which sees itself as part of the initiative proposed in Turkey, Turkish security policy expert Omar Ozkizilcik believes it is uncertain how any new process involving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its Syrian branch and People’s Protection Units can be executed.

Ozkizilcik told Enab Baladi that the sustainability of this process or the extent of Abdullah Öcalan’s influence on the ground remains unclear, noting that the last attempt at a peace process between Turkey and the PKK ended “disastrously,” resulting in hundreds of deaths.

The current geopolitical scene does not support any new process, according to Ozkizilcik, and many potential obstacles could hinder the process, even if there was a genuine desire to achieve peace.

The Turkish expert added that it is impossible for Turkey to consider any peace process that does not involve Syria, but the current proposed process has yet to reach that stage.

On the agenda of reconciliation

In the midst of the ongoing military escalation during the last week of October, coinciding with the proposal of an arms initiative between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Ahmet Yıldız, called on member states of the Security Council to classify the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) as terrorist organizations, following an attack on a military company in Ankara.

Yıldız stated that one of the most serious consequences of the Syrian conflict has been the exploitation of the chaos by terrorist organizations to pursue their separatist agenda, considering that the YPG/PKK threaten the unity of Syrian territory, according to what Anadolu Agency reported.

The Turkish representative added, “I hope that the member states in the next meeting will add the PKK, its branches (YPG) and (SDF) to the lists of terrorist organizations that are active in Syria.”

The conflicting signals regarding Turkey’s continued attacks on forces that form a cornerstone of the components of the Autonomous Administration (SDF and YPG), while simultaneously seeking to end its hostility towards these components, comes in parallel with the ongoing attempts to normalize relations with the Syrian regime for the purpose of “combating terrorism” in Syria.

At the beginning of November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that normalizing relations between Turkey and the Syrian regime is of great importance for sustainable stability in Syria and enhancing security in the Middle East region.

Lavrov added in statements to the Turkish Hurriyet newspaper that Russia is making continuous efforts to end the conflict between Damascus and Ankara, indicating that he discussed this issue with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts in a meeting of the foreign ministers of the guarantor countries of the Astana process in New York on September 27.

On October 25, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that he asked his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to take steps to ensure that the Syrian regime’s President Bashar al-Assad responds to Turkey’s call for a normalization process between the two sides.

Erdoğan clarified in remarks to Turkish media reported by the Yeni Şafak newspaper that he discussed the Syrian issue with Putin during his participation in the BRICS summit in Kazan.

He mentioned that he discussed with Putin the issue of a meeting with al-Assad and said, “From the beginning, we have always stated that we support the protection of Syria’s territorial integrity and the establishment of lasting and fair peace in our neighborhood, in addition to safeguarding our borders.”

Turkish journalist Dilara Aslan believes that Turkey is moving toward normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, so it can be expected that the presence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northeastern Syria will be another issue on the agenda between Erdoğan and al-Assad, even amid the current peace initiative on the Turkish political table.

She added that the YPG already controls a semi-autonomous region, holds elections, and generates income through illicit trade or oil exports, and countries like the United States may not be willing to abandon it, but it is possible to reach a different formula with them, of course.

Despite the strong ideological foundation shared by the PKK and its affiliated groups, each of its branches has its own interests and geopolitical context even within the PKK itself. There are opinions that still view Abdullah Öcalan as a leader and others that rejected his leadership in recent years. It is likely that Turkey will consider the evolving situation and how long Öcalan’s influence continues in any forthcoming dialogue process.

Dilara Aslan, Head of the Daily Sabah newspaper office in Ankara

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian regime president Bashar al-Assad (Modified by Enab Baladi)

Based on Ankara’s view of the SDF as an extension of the PKK, Turkey launched military operations against the SDF to push them away from border areas, namely Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in Aleppo’s countryside in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring east of the Euphrates in 2019.

In contrast, the SDF attempts to distance itself from the conflict between the PKK and Turkey, especially after Ankara’s recent attack, as evidenced by the statement of Mazloum Abdi, SDF leader, to al-Hurra channel on October 30, asserting that his faction is not part of the ongoing fighting between Turkey and the PKK.

The SDF has repeatedly declared its readiness for rapprochement with Turkey, the Syrian opposition, and the Syrian regime, especially after every pressure it faces.

They have also worked to strengthen ties with Arab countries and Russia and maintain political activities in several European countries, particularly as they control prisons housing elements of the Islamic State (IS) group and the camps where families of IS fighters of various nationalities reside.

Turkey continues to exclude the SDF from the dialogue sphere, directing multiple strikes towards them following the Ankara attack. President Erdoğan stated that Turkey executed 470 strikes against the PKK in Syria and Iraq during October.

Despite repeated meetings between the Syrian regime’s security apparatus and the SDF in an attempt by the latter to gain recognition or integration into the state army while maintaining their military specificity, the regime has not recognized them and has not responded positively.

Regionally, Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in east of the Euphrates in October 2019 expanded Moscow’s presence in areas under the SDF’s control, bringing Russia into play after the Sochi Agreement concerning east of the Euphrates between Erdoğan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Will the pressure decrease?

Kurdish affairs researcher and director of the Raman Studies Center, Badr Mulla Rashid, told Enab Baladi that attempts at rapprochement from the SDF can be viewed from a different angle. The Autonomous Administration and the SDF have been seeking to get closer to certain Arab countries based on two main drivers: first, the existing conflict with Turkey, and second, having these countries take on the responsibility of confronting “extremist organizations and politically Islamist groups.”

As for the SDF’s relationship with the regime, it has determinants that extend back four decades, some of which are logistical, and others ideological, especially when considering the addition of the Shiite Iranian factor to the equation.

If Turkey’s steps regarding the PKK develop positively, according to assessments of disarmament and peace-building, this nascent peace, along with a reduction in the intensity of disputes between Turkey and some Arab countries, would be to the benefit of the Autonomous Administration, according to Rashid, and, to a degree, would be beneficial to the United States due to the reduction of tensions among its primary allies in the Middle East.

Rashid explained to Enab Baladi that Russian influence is complex, tied to historical leftist motives, as well as the turbulent relationship between Turkey and Russia prior to 2016. The dynamics of Russian influence on the Autonomous Administration became intricate following the Olive Branch and subsequently Peace Spring operations.

Currently, Russian influence is linked to Turkey’s willingness and readiness to carry out any new military operation against the SDF. If the prospects for military operations decrease, a new balance may emerge and Russian influence could wane, as seen in recent events in Deir Ezzor countryside, where tensions arose between regime officers and the Russian side, alongside SDF representatives during meetings aimed at ceasing military operations.

Ibrahim Kaban, director of the Geostrategic Studies Center, commented on the Turkish initiative, noting that if Ankara intends to transition to global standards in its industries, policies, relations, and strategies, it needs some internal development aimed at reducing confrontations with the PKK.

According to Kaban, the role of the PKK in Turkish events is significant, forming a “real dilemma for Turkey,” thus Ankara is “forced” to pursue a different approach rather than entering into confrontations with the PKK and the Autonomous Administration. He added that “dialogue with the SDF is an American demand, of course, as they (the Americans) need it.”

He further added that engaging in dialogue, rapprochement, understanding, and investing in SDF-held areas, as exemplified by Turkish economic investments in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, serves Turkey’s interests.