The last four years have helped consolidate low-key estrangement as the new normal in U.S.-Turkish relations. After decades of worrying about losing Turkey, Washington has now lowered its expectations for Turkish cooperation while seeking simply to avert new crises. So long as Turkey avoids actively supporting U.S. rivals, picking fights with U.S. partners, or blocking key NATO business, this status quo can work for Washington.
U.S. policymakers remain reflexively eager to improve ties but have increasingly accepted that the ball is in Ankara’s court. Turkey is still, in the abstract, just as relevant to some of Washington’s biggest foreign policy challenges as ever. But with Ankara so insistent on charting its own course, U.S. policymakers have recognized the limits of coordinating with Turkey or breathlessly courting its support. Instead, they have deployed carrots and sticks effectively—not to reset the terms of the relationship but to secure specific forms of cooperation where it was necessary for broader U.S. goals.
The next administration should maintain this approach. It should keep expectations low, stay on the lookout for new risks, and focus on strengthening Turkish democracy over the long term.
The new normal
Over the past year, a few key moments have helped reveal the contours of the new U.S.-Turkish relationship.
Less than a week after the attacks on October 7, 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken flew to the Middle East to meet with regional allies and partners. Turkey was not included in the trip. This was not an intentional snub, but rather a reflection of the fact that Ankara was not expected to make a meaningful contribution to managing the evolving conflict. Then, last May, there was the abrupt cancellation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s never-quite-announced visit to the White House. After weeks of discussion, Erdoğan called off his planned trip; it appears Ankara and Washington could not agree on a protocol that would meet both governments’ political needs.
Set alongside these two non-events were concerted diplomatic efforts to manage more concrete issues. Following a year and a half of negotiations, Washington ultimately helped secure Turkey’s acquiescence to Sweden’s NATO membership. To do so, the Biden administration worked with Congress to make the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara an explicit quid pro quo for Swedish entry into the alliance. In responding to the invasion of Ukraine, the administration has also successfully pressured Turkish companies into complying with sanctions on Russia, even as the Turkish government has declined to impose its own sanctions. More recently, Washington has renewed efforts to resolve the impasse created by Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles and the resulting sanctions from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. But this effort largely follows the contours of previous ones, requiring Turkey to verifiably surrender control of the missiles. As of now, the decision to accept or reject this offer remains in Erdoğan’s hands.
In short, under the new normal, forms of cooperation that would once have been relatively non-controversial, like a White House visit or the sale of fighter jets, have now become increasingly controversial or the subject of contentious wrangling. Meanwhile, Ankara, which has repeatedly proclaimed its commitment to a more independent foreign policy, is now less aligned with U.S. objectives in both Europe and the Middle East. Turkey is not inclined to play its traditional role of a U.S. ally, nor is it able to play the meaningful mediator role that Erdoğan once hoped in conflicts like Ukraine or Gaza. Washington certainly welcomed Turkey’s negotiation of a grain deal with Russia. But when this broke down the United States turned to other allies like Romania and Bulgaria to help secure Ukrainian exports, while Turkey sought to avoid confrontations with Russia in the Black Sea.
Finally, where Turkey has pursued a less confrontational foreign policy in recent years, this does not mean that the accumulated challenges can be easily unraveled. As shown with the purchase of S-400 systems, reversing the damage done over the past decade requires concrete political decisions that Erdoğan does not appear ready to take. And, of course, if regional developments or domestic political calculations lead Erdoğan to pivot back to more provocative policies, this damage could be compounded.
Risks and opportunities
Moving forward, U.S. policymakers should remain alert for any realistic opportunities to cooperate with Turkey while working to preempt developments that could sabotage the status quo.
In the near future, the conflict in the Middle East will prove the biggest source of tension between the United States and Turkey. Washington and Ankara have vociferously backed opposing sides in Gaza: Ankara’s rhetorical and political support for Hamas terrorism has generated deep anger in the United States, while Washington’s military support for Israeli war crimes has generated deep anger in Turkey. Erdoğan has so far carefully calibrated the substance of Turkey’s political response, announcing a moratorium on trade with Israel while still facilitating key forms of it. Yet as the conflict widens, and anti-Israeli, anti-American sentiment in Turkey mounts, Erdoğan may take further concrete steps that would drive a backlash in Washington and further damage relations.
The escalating conflict between Israel and Iran will also put more focus on Erdoğan’s position. Ankara is unlikely to ever take the firmly anti-Iranian stance some in Washington hope for. Rather, if the war expands, Turkey will likely follow its approach to the conflict in Ukraine, refusing to take sides while working to advance its own more immediate regional interests. Ankara would be well positioned to take advantage of a weakened Iran in order to consolidate its position in Syria, expand its influence in Iraq, and back Azerbaijan in demanding further concessions from Armenia. Turkish advocates in Washington will undoubtedly market these measures as evidence of U.S.-Turkish alignment, but they are more likely to produce continued, if muted, frustration.
In other realms, such as Africa, Turkey’s independent foreign policy will continue to advance at an oblique angle to U.S. interests. Growing Turkish military and economic engagement on the continent will advance U.S. goals, to the extent it allows local governments to diversify away from China. But that engagement will also subvert U.S. goals to the extent it furthers instability, undermines democracy, and supplants U.S. influence. Coordinating around the margins or on key issues might be possible, but Ankara is unlikely to substantially alter its approach to accommodate U.S. objectives.
Finally, amidst their disagreements, Washington and Ankara have appreciated the value of NATO as a framework for preserving a basic level of engagement. Despite mutual frustrations, both sides have largely isolated day-to-day military business within the alliance from bilateral tensions. With Turkey buffeted by wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, this serves as an increasingly important venue for coordination and helps preserve the possibility of joint action on pressing issues in the future.
Long-term goals
Beyond trying to manage these risks and opportunities, U.S. policy should remain focused on the long-term importance of Turkish democracy. While Washington has limited leverage here, a return to robust democratic rule is a prerequisite for rebuilding a more durable U.S.-Turkish alliance. A free and economically vibrant Turkey that is well integrated with Europe will always be a better partner for Washington. Moreover, Erdoğan has repeatedly fallen back on anti-American conspiracies and anti-Western rhetoric in consolidating his authoritarian rule, while crackdowns on Kurdish rights have consistently fueled instability in Turkey and the region. As a result, only a democratic Turkey is likely to be stable and truly Western-aligned.
Turkish and American voters will continue to disagree, and democracy isn’t a panacea for bilateral disputes. However, Washington should not waver in its commitment to democratic change. Historically, Washington has tempered its support for democracy in Turkey when undemocratic leaders have proven cooperative. Many Turkish voters, who have demonstrated their continued commitment to democracy, remember this, and it has helped fuel some of the cynicism and hostility that continue to poison U.S.-Turkish relations today.
With this in mind, the next administration should be consistent in its support for Turkish democracy, striving to maintain today’s modest estrangement until conditions permit both countries to move beyond their new normal.
