The U.S.-Turkish relationship has long been no stranger to tensions. However, geopolitical turmoil has driven a deeper wedge between the two NATO allies over the past decade.
There is a familiar refrain among Turkey experts about how the relationship deteriorated. The mess left behind by the U.S. intervention in Iraq two decades ago—against vehement objections from the Turkish side—still reverberates in Turkish minds. The Syrian civil war became a major point of contention between Ankara and Washington, as their priorities diverged significantly. Tensions were further heightened by the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, with many Turks believing the United States had been slow to condemn the coup and suspicions of possible American involvement circulating widely.
Meanwhile, the United States has viewed Turkey’s growing alignment with Russia, especially its purchase of the S-400 missile defense system, as a symbolic break from the West and a challenge to NATO. This move culminated in Washington expelling Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019 and imposing sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), solidifying the rift between the two nations. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza further complicated the situation.
One could argue that these events have unfolded so rapidly that there has been little time to fully comprehend their impact. Yet one thing is clear: when events outpace the ability of institutions—and their underlying cultures—to adapt, relationships inevitably deteriorate. Trust is often the first casualty. And when trust is lost, actors shift to non-trust-based methods to reduce uncertainty, placing greater emphasis on retaliatory mechanisms.
In U.S.-Turkish relations, the issue of trust—or its absence—consistently emerges as the key problem, yet it remains elusive. Is the loss of trust primarily driven by rapid changes in geopolitics, or does it stem from deeper divergences between the two nations? Moreover, is the lack of trust reshaping the relationship itself? More importantly, how can it be reversed? The answer might have something to do with the rules that govern how power is wielded.
Personalization of power and erosion of trust
Over the past decade and across the globe, we’ve seen the rise of personalized regimes. In such environments, trust no longer flows from institutions but from the personal ties of those in power, with relationships between leaders shaping the course of nations. This explains the informal bond between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as shared norms like masculine honor have nurtured bilateral ties.
While the personalization of power following Turkey’s 2016 shift to presidentialism has opened alternative avenues for building trust between Turkey and nations with similar centralized systems, it has simultaneously deepened the growing distrust between Turkey and the United States. Turkish policymakers, accustomed to more centralized decisionmaking, often view the American system as fragmented and unreliable. They struggle to understand why the U.S. president appears unable to make binding promises without the backing of Congress, often perceiving this separation of powers not only as a weakness but also irrelevant or unimportant. After all, similar regimes tend to understand and trust each other more easily. This is why Ankara often found Donald Trump’s leadership style more manageable, despite the numerous crises and volatility that characterized bilateral ties during his presidency.
Conversely, U.S. policymakers have increasingly viewed the Turkish system under Erdoğan as informal and unpredictable, perceiving Ankara as an unreliable partner prone to sudden shifts in its actions. Public perception in the United States has also shifted, with Turkey seen less as an ally and more as a norm-breaker. Ankara’s anti-Western rhetoric, concerns about democracy and the rule of law in Turkey, and episodes from the abrupt decision to purchase the S-400 missile system and the Pastor Andrew Brunson case to the indictment of New York City Mayor Eric Adams have further damaged Turkey’s image. While deinstitutionalization and the personalization of power have had significant costs for U.S.-Turkish relations, neither side has fully crossed a red line, preventing a complete break.
The civilizational divide and growing distrust
Trust is not only built through institutions and similar power-wielding mechanisms—culture also plays a critical role. Democratic backsliding in Turkey is a reality, but the growing prominence of a civilizational rift with the West is an even more significant shift. Anti-American sentiment in Turkey has long-standing historical roots, but what’s new is how these views have merged with the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) narrative, now framed within a broader divergence from Western norms and values. The stalling of Turkey’s European Union accession process and a broader trend of de-Europeanization is both a cause and a collateral of this shift.
Turkey is now increasingly portrayed, both by domestic politicians and by their Western partners, as not only having different geopolitical interests but also as being culturally and civilizationally distinct from the West. While full alignment over values and principles may not be achievable (or even desirable), positioning the country in opposition to the culture of its allies is certainly detrimental to trust. Even in brief moments when relations seemed to improve, this distrust resurfaces stronger than before. The Gaza conflict and Turkey’s criticism of U.S. support for Israel are good examples of that. In this context, Ankara’s view of the West as morally distinct and inferior reinforces a distrust that no diplomatic effort or transactional engagement alone can easily overcome.
Indeed, the only solution to the erosion of trust, as is often suggested, is a return to transactional relations. Yet even in the exchange of favors, trust remains the quiet pulse beneath—an unspoken assurance that promises will be honored, that progress won’t be met with retreat.
A post-Erdoğan Turkey?
U.S.-Turkish relations will of course continue beyond the lifetime of the current Turkish government. But yet most proposals for rebuilding relations are rooted in assumptions shaped by the Erdoğan era, presuming that the current dynamics will continue into the future.
While these assumptions may currently hold, the prospect of a different, post-Erdoğan Turkey is increasingly gaining attention. The 2023 general elections and the 2024 local elections have highlighted the Turkish opposition, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), as a formidable force, marking the most significant political shift in 22 years. Although achieving an electoral victory in the next general elections remains challenging, opposition mayors in conservative boroughs and cities across Turkey are actively crafting a vision for a future beyond Erdoğan.
Some of the dynamics shaping Turkey’s trajectory are expected to endure in a post-Erdoğan era. Although Turkey is a highly polarized country, a common thread weaves through its political divisions, reflecting the zeitgeist of global politics: strategic autonomy, regional ambitions, and search for alternative allies. These aspirations have indeed become deeply ingrained and widely embraced within Turkish society, positioning them to persist regardless of who holds power.
However, there are also significant differences between political forces. The CHP’s criticisms toward Western governments, including the United States, often focus on specific policy disagreements, reflecting broader strategic concerns rather than deep-rooted anti-Westernism or anti-Americanism. This is in contrast to the current government’s approach, which tends to frame its relationship with the West through the prism of civilizational conflict, portraying tensions as part of a larger existential struggle between differing worldviews.
Additionally, the CHP has committed to strengthening Turkey’s institutions and restoring democratic governance. This also entails reigniting the European Union (EU) accession process by focusing on cooperation, trade, and strategic cooperation, even if membership remains a distant goal. The EU-Turkey relationship has similarly been shaped by loss of trust and deinstitutionalization, mirroring patterns seen in Ankara’s ties with Washington. A new political agenda that harmonizes Turkey’s domestic democratization efforts with a comprehensive strategy for reengagement with the EU is key to restoring institutional cooperation and rebuilding mutual trust.
Reinstitutionalizing governance and reengaging with the West without emphasizing civilizational differences could help address the root causes of eroded trust and provide a pathway to rebuilding it. While Western governments and scholars have confronted a U.S.-Turkish relationship shaped by certain patterns, these may not reflect Turkey’s future. Forward-looking approaches to U.S.-Turkish relations should consider this potential for changes. Yet, only time will tell if the wounds inflicted over the last decade on Turkey’s institutions and its bonds with allies can heal enough to foster and sustain this renewal.
