Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Black Sea’s strategic significance has increased—and Turkey’s position as a key Black Sea power and NATO member has become more crucial for the Alliance’s efforts to counter revisionist Russia. In recent years, mutual distrust and substantial estrangement have defined the relationship between Turkey and the West, with the Black Sea region reflecting this broader context. To overcome the distrust of Ankara and to facilitate Turkey’s aligning and coordinating with its partners would require considerable efforts to smooth Turkey-West relations, sometimes on tracks that have nothing to do with the Black Sea itself.
Turkey and the West have long collaborated on Black Sea stability, countering Russian revisionism, supporting the resilience of post-Soviet states, and leveraging the region’s energy and connectivity. However, for some countries, Turkey’s quest for autonomy has sometimes appeared to clash with the West’s NATO commitments, raising concerns about whether Ankara supports or obstructs NATO goals. Ankara’s grievances, in its perspective, are related to its perception that Western partners have insufficiently acknowledged Turkey’s security concerns, presumably overlooking the broader threats Turkey faces beyond those in the Black Sea region.
Despite tensions, Turkey and the West share similar security threats and have common interests in the Black Sea region. There are clear opportunities for more effective cooperation should the parties display the will to do so.
Common interests in the Black Sea
One shared goal is restoring the regional security order in the Black Sea, free from Russian coercion. This includes reestablishing Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova’s territorial integrity, strengthening their democratic anchoring, and supporting their future NATO and EU membership. Strengthening NATO’s posture in the Black Sea, despite Turkey’s objections to a larger presence of non-littoral NATO states such as the United States, remains a mutual interest. Ankara has complied with all measures and decisions of the Alliance aimed at enhancing NATO’s defense and security posture since 2014 and has consistently supported the Alliance’s defense efforts in the Black Sea, for example by contributing forces to air policing in Romania and a NATO battlegroup in Bulgaria.
A second goal held in common is the strengthening of Turkey’s regional leadership and leveraging Turkey’s convening power and its experience in dealing with the multifaceted Black Sea region. Supporting Turkey’s interest in normalizing relations with Armenia, facilitating a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and promoting stability in the South Caucasus through connectivity projects could help make it easier to achieve Turkish and Western common interests.
A third shared priority is containing Russia and supporting Ukraine, albeit with certain caveats, as Turkey maintains strategic ties with both Ukraine and Russia. Ankara is assisting Ukraine’s war effort through intensive defense cooperation, while its transactional and compartmentalized relationship with Russia is thriving too. Despite the differences between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance in both actions and narratives vis-à-vis Russia, Ukraine has undeniably emerged as a strategic partner for Turkey in curbing Russia’s expansionism in the Black Sea region.
Finally, the West and Turkey’s common goals include leveraging Turkey’s mediation endeavors, as they can be advantageous in the broader shared objective to end Russia’s war and stabilize the region. Turkey played a key role in the Black Sea Grain Deal, and it has mediated or facilitated prisoner exchanges, including the 2022 release of 215 Ukrainian prisoners and the 2024 prisoner swap between Russia and the West.
Divergent threat perceptions
While Turkey and the West share several goals in the Black Sea region, deep-seated divergences in threat perception, notably in regard to the security environment, limit the potential of Turkey and the West pursuing shared interests. Turkey views Russia’s war against Ukraine as an isolated regional conflict, which contrasts with how other NATO members perceive the war. Turkey’s view is influenced by its prioritization of other threats over the war in Ukraine, for example the threats of terrorism and the war in Syria. Although some Turkish experts have argued that Ankara perceives Russia as a threat, this view has not been openly expressed by the Turkish government, which refrains from formally designating Russia as a threat.
Despite condemning Russia’s aggression and cooperating with Ukraine in the military domain, Turkey’s view of the war often echoes the Russian narrative. For example, political discourse in Turkey has framed the conflict as a great power struggle and accused the West of provoking Russia. Public opinion in Turkey reflects a similar divergence in perception from the West, with many believing that both Russia and Ukraine share responsibility for the war. Ankara appears to be avoiding both a complete Ukrainian defeat and a total Russian victory, with a defeated Russia seemingly not among Turkey’s interests.
On one hand, Turkey’s policies have indirectly supported Russia’s resilience and prolonged its ability to wage war. On the other, Turkey’s low-profile but significant contributions to Ukraine’s defense efforts are undeniable. The critical question is just how much damage is inflicted on the policies to deter Russia by Turkey’s enabling Moscow. Such damage could outweigh the benefits of Ankara’s actions for Ukraine’s, NATO’s, or Turkey’s security.
Bridging the gaps
For more effective cooperation in the Black Sea, Turkey and the West must align their approaches. They can do so by cooperating more closely in the military domain, complementing NATO’s efforts and involving Romania, Bulgaria, and partners such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Extending Turkey-Ukraine defense cooperation to third countries supporting Ukraine, such as the United Kingdom, should be explored. In the medium term, Turkey may be becoming increasingly inclined to contemplate and endorse initiatives aimed at reestablishing a security equilibrium advantageous to Western (including Turkish) interests. Ankara may be willing to consider multilateral projects aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s capabilities without placing itself at the forefront of confrontation with Russia, while still providing a more meaningful deterrent against Russia.
Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy requires reducing its reliance on Russia and addressing vulnerabilities that Russia exploits in societal, economic, and security sectors. Turkey must close loopholes allowing Russia to bypass sanctions, such as halting the reexport of Western dual-use goods and technologies to Russia. Additionally, it is crucial to address the risks posed by Russia’s influence operations in Turkey, which fuel anti-West narratives.
The fact that Turkey’s approach sometimes aligns favorably with Russia does not necessarily mean that Turkey adopts this approach for Russia’s benefit. That means that there is an opportunity for Turkey to pursue its interests while reducing its dependence on Russia, through fostering cooperation with the West in the Black Sea. Though Turkey’s initiatives with Russia should be welcomed if they help make Russia halt its war, closer coordination with allies is essential to ensure these initiatives don’t undermine efforts to contain Russia.
Significant changes in Turkey’s stance on Black Sea issues would require broader reconciliation with the United States and improvement in the relationship between Turkey and the European Union (EU). Renewing a structured foreign-policy and security dialogue between Turkey and the EU, one that focuses on joint strategies for their shared region, should be a priority.
While a significant departure from Turkey’s current stance is unlikely, a shift in approach is possible as the number of areas of policy convergence grows. Western partners should encourage Turkey to explore these areas and take a more strategic approach, moving beyond short-term, transactional relations. While Turkey and the West diverge in their perceptions and discourses about the security situation around the Black Sea, Turkey and the West’s interests in the Black Sea are more closely aligned than publicly acknowledged—and that makes progress more possible.
Maryna Vorotnyuk is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, headquartered in London. Follow her on X @VorotnyukMaryna.
This blog is part of a joint research project of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program and the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies entitled “A Sea of Opportunities: Can the West Benefit from Turkey’s Autonomous Foreign Policy in the Black Sea?” The research provides a lens into Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership and identifies possible avenues of collaboration between Ankara and its Western allies in the Black Sea region in several areas, such as defense and military cooperation, political and diplomatic dialogue, and maritime and energy security.
Further reading
Image: Flags of NATO member countries flutter at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, February 28, 2020. REUTERS/Francois Lenoir
