The bribery charges leveled against New York City Mayor Eric Adams might seem like just another corruption scandal to many, but the involvement of a consortium of Turkish businesspeople and the Turkish government points to a whole new dynamic of transnational forces, global capitalism and a wave of corruption from abroad that has zeroed in on American politicians.
As a New Yorker and sociology professor who has researched the Turkish government and Turkish business elite, two details stand out to me from the indictment because they point to somewhat contradictory elements.
The first is that one significant favor allegedly obtained was to hasten the opening of New York’s “Turkish House,” a brand-new, tulip-shaped Manhattan high-rise which harbors the country’s consulate and UN mission, in addition to a cultural center. Those involved must have felt proud of the building for the power it projected abroad. Federal prosecutors allege that they used the leverage they had over the mayor to bypass fire inspections so that the building would be opened in time for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s planned visit to the U.S. In many ways, the building encapsulates Erdogan’s political trajectory.
Whereas Turkey’s previous political elite was secularist and shied away from expansionist policies, Erdogan has managed to stay in power by offering lucrative government contracts to a new rising Muslim bourgeoisie and appealing to the more religious and nationalist segments of society through the promise of reviving the old glory of Turkey’s Ottoman Empire. With motifs close to the Islamic art found under the Ottoman Empire and the involvement of a Turkish construction company, this building typifies the image of the country the president wants to project.
The second interesting element has to do with the businesspeople involved. Besides the construction company and Turkish Airlines, which are closely connected to the Turkish government, other members of the business elite allegedly involved in the scandal (through offers of cash donations or lavish stays in an Istanbul hotel) are closer to the country’s secular, old-money establishment and do not perfectly fit the profile of businesspeople President Erdogan typically supports.
Throughout the 20th century, Turkey’s economic elite was secular and looked to the West as a model to modernize the country. They made their fortunes because they were close to like-minded bureaucrats, military generals and politicians who tended to exclude the more religious, popular classes from the establishment. During the 21st century, Erdogan consolidated his power by incorporating people from the country’s margins through Islam and by shifting government contracts toward a new pious capitalist class to supplant the old elite. Large corporations and the secular families that control them have still survived thanks to their importance to the economy. But they have also been the objects of Erdogan’s ire. He often calls them thieves, while targeting them with populist threats and frequent government tax audits.
The fact that the alleged web of patronage around Adams includes a diverse cast of characters is interesting. It might be indicative of the extent to which the mayor was open to accepting gifts and donations on his frequent trips. While illegal cash donations are not part of the norm, it is common in Turkey to offer favors such as room upgrades to gain a powerful person’s loyalty. As a New York City public servant, the mayor should have declined these so as not to break the law. This kind of attention, however, can also be very flattering to people who are on an upward social trajectory. The involvement of different actors from Turkey’s political spectrum, if part of a concerted effort, also says something broader about state-business relations, the nature of global capitalism and the role of megalopolises like New York.
In the past, secular officials often collaborated with Muslim religious groups if they could bolster the Turkish state’s place abroad through such actions as opening schools and cultural centers. It seems that today the roles are reversed and that the more religious political class is also willing to act in concert with secular businesspeople to advance the country’s political, cultural and economic position. With global free trade giving way to economic nationalism, these kinds of partnerships will become increasingly common in Turkey and beyond.
Competing for government contracts and power within Turkey might seem like a zero-sum game to actors from different ends of the political spectrum. But collaborating abroad allows them to share a bigger pie while improving Turkey’s image. Unlike central governments, local governments and the politicians who head them like Adams offer a more direct, personal point of access to such sectors as education and construction. They too mirror the types of networks that mesh well with the kinds of state-business relations that nations like Turkey have built. Moreover, cosmopolitan cities like New York still maintain an important place in the world economy and offer nations visibility. We should expect to see many more local politicians increasingly become appealing soft targets for foreign patronage networks.
