On Sept. 4, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Ankara, marking Sisi’ first visit to Turkey since taking power in 2014. Despite the optics of reconciliation, this encounter is better understood as a calculated move by both leaders to advance specific economic and geopolitical interests.
Relations between the two nations have been frosty since 2013, when Erdogan condemned Sisi’ ousting of Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s then-Muslim Brotherhood leader. Erdogan’s denunciation of Sisi as a “tyrant” and “brutal killer,” as well as his 2019 vow that he would “never talk to someone like” Sisi seemed to cement an irreparable rift.
This dynamic began to shift in 2020, when Erdogan launched a broader charm offensive across the Middle East. Yet, rapprochement with Egypt came with demands Erdogan could not easily meet, such as ending Turkish military activities in Libya, terminating support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which he earnestly provided, beginning in 2014, and resolving maritime border and energy disputes with Cyprus and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkish Presidency via AP Images
A turning point came during the 2022 FIFA World Cup, where Erdogan shook Sisi’ hand on the sidelines. By July 2023, the two countries exchanged ambassadors for the first time since 2013, signaling a thaw in relations. Despite this, their motivations for rapprochement are rooted in diverging domestic and regional needs.
What exactly does Egypt need from Turkey, and what does Turkey need from Egypt?
For Egypt, the East Mediterranean represents untapped potential in energy exploration. Ankara’s assertiveness in the region, often at odds with Egyptian allies Greece and Cyprus, poses a challenge to Cairo’s ambitions. In Libya, Turkey’s military backs factions opposed to Egyptian interests, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.
By improving relations with Erdogan, Sisi hopes to neutralize these threats and transform them into opportunities.
Egypt’s economic situation adds urgency to Sisi’ diplomatic efforts. Plagued by record high inflation, soaring unemployment, and a crippling debt crisis, Cairo is in dire need of foreign investment. Mending ties with Ankara could unlock new foreign investment and trade opportunities, allowing Sisi to reduce his dependency on the traditional Gulf allies.
Erdogan’s calculations, however, are more about reasserting Turkey’s role in the region. For the last decade, Erdogan spared no effort to ruin Ankara’s ties with virtually every power in the Middle East and North Africa, and not for strategic reasons. In Egypt’s case, Erdogan’s unwavering support for the Muslim Brotherhood drove a wedge between the two nations. A similar story is seen in Erdogan’s relationship with Israel, which he damaged for political gains with ideologically Islamist voters.
Restoring ties with Cairo offers Erdogan a chance to reverse course on his failed isolationist strategy. Beyond the regional rivalries, rapprochement with Cairo also helps Ankara gain influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a platform that Turkey has been excluded from.
More pressing, Erdogan seeks to leverage Egypt’s standing as an Arab power into a foothold in Gaza. Without Egypt, Erdogan has no voice due to his relentless and unapologetic support of Hamas. By strategically engaging Cairo, Ankara positions itself as a central player in regional politics, enhancing its position against these competing forces.
These strategic interests were front and center at the Sept. 4 meeting. Discussions reportedly included the situation in Libya, energy disputes, economic collaborations, and potential joint ventures in energy and infrastructure projects. While Sisi seemed ready to listen to Erdogan, he’s not naïve.
Erdogan’s decade-long rhetorical insults against Sisi are one thing, but one must not overlook the length Erdogan went to offering shelter to Muslim Brotherhood operatives inside Turkey. The support extended to the Brotherhood was multifaceted, to include the opening of a TV channel, all the way to outward political championing offered by Erdogan and his government. Sisi will be keen to know what measures Ankara will roll out to terminate the Brotherhood’s existence inside its borders.
However, significant limitations and risks shadow this “marriage of convenience.”
Deep-rooted ideological differences—especially over Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood—remain unsolved and could reignite tensions. Erdogan’s tactical support for Islamist groups, even if toned down, is likely to unsettle Sisi if mismanaged by Ankara.
Moreover, the partnership in its current form is primarily driven by immediate economic and geopolitical needs, making it susceptible to shifts. Egypt’s economic crisis and Erdogan’s desire for influence are unlikely to disappear, but any changes in their respective situations could unravel the relationship.
While Sisi is often seen as a pragmatic leader, Egypt’s mounting domestic challenges are beginning to expose cracks in his strongman grip. Erdogan, known for his unpredictable foreign policy, often reacts to domestic and regional pressures. This volatility means the current détente could quickly unravel, highlighting the precariousness of their rapprochement and the ever-present risk that today’s cooperation could become tomorrow’s conflict.
Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an associate professor of national security studies at Marine Corps University. Follow him on X @SinanCiddi.
Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at the FDD. Follow her on X @themariamwahba.
The views expressed in this article are the writers’ own.
